President Joe Biden might be right that the use of tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine will lead to “Armageddon.” Since NATO is outmatched 250 to 2,000 in the category of non-strategic nuclear weapons, it may well have to choose between escalation to the strategic level of war (which would be disastrous for all concerned regardless of the outcome) or defeat if it finds itself on the wrong side of the nuclear threshold. Ironically, some of the Western commentators who most fervently oppose the use of any nuclear weapons see this rather precarious position as desirable: they want the United States to carry out massive retaliation in the case of any nuclear use against NATO forces, or at the very least threaten to do so. They believe that the best method for a country to deter a nuclear attack is to repudiate the very idea that a nuclear war could be limited, even to the point of unilaterally abandoning the capability to fight such a war. Merely possessing the capacity for limited war—so the argument goes—demonstrates to one’s adversary that there is some level of nuclear conflict that you find tolerable, and this makes nuclear war more likely. Possess only the capability for massive retaliation, and you will never have to use it. This is an alluring argument: it offers us the best possible outcome at a relatively low dollar cost. But everything has a price, and in the case of minimum deterrence, the price is extreme risk.
