

ISLAMIST TERRORIST ATTACKS IN THE WORLD 1979-2024

New edition

Data collected through 12 April 2024

OCTOBER 2024

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**ISLAMIST
TERRORIST
ATTACKS
IN THE WORLD
1979-2024**

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
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The main lessons of the study

1. Between 1979 and April 2024, we recorded 66,872 Islamist attacks worldwide. These attacks caused the deaths of at least 249,941 people.

- 1979-2000: 2,194 attacks and 6,817 deaths.
- 2001-2012: 8,265 attacks and 38,187 deaths.
- 2013-April 2024: 56,413 attacks and 204,937 deaths.

Islamist attacks around the world are more numerous today than ever before



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Interpretive framework: Between 2013 and 2024, 56,413 Islamist attacks took place worldwide, representing 84.4% of all recorded attacks since 1979.

2. On average, an Islamist attack caused the deaths of 3.7 people.

- 1979-2000: an attack killed an average of 3.1 people.
- 2001-2012: an attack killed an average of 4.6 people.
- 2013-April 2024: an attack killed an average of 3.6 people.

3. Firearms were the most used weapons (26,925), followed closely by explosives (25,832), melee weapons such as knives or machetes (2,479) and incendiary weapons (1,162)*.

- 1979-2000: firearms (911), explosives (856), melee weapons (124), incendiary weapons (68).
- 2001-2012: firearms (2,572), explosives (4,516), melee weapons (198), incendiary weapons (234).
- 2013-April 2024: firearms (23,442), explosives (20,460), melee weapons (2,157), incendiary weapons (860).

4. The Middle East and North Africa, South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa accounted for 96.7% of Islamist attacks between 1979 and April 2024.

- South Asia: 31.2% of attacks, 33.7% of deaths.
- Middle East and North Africa: 30.4% of attacks, 33% of deaths.
- Sub-Saharan Africa : 35.2% of attacks, 30.1% of deaths.
- Southeast Asia: 2.6% of attacks, 1.1% of deaths.
- Europe and Russia: 0.4% of attacks, 0.7% of deaths.
- North America: 0.1% of attacks, 1.3% of deaths.
- Oceania: 0.01% of attacks, 0.005% of deaths.
- South America: 0.004% of attacks, 0.05% of deaths.

*Data from Mozambique have not been included, as the databases used for this country do not allow us to identify the types of weapons used.

5. Within the European Union, France was the country most affected by Islamist terrorism, with 85 attacks committed on its soil between 1979 and April 2024. At least 334 people were killed in these attacks.

- 1979-2000: 24 attacks, 32 deaths.
- 2001-2012: 8 attacks, 8 deaths.
- 2013-April 2024: 53 attacks, 294 deaths.

6. Afghanistan was the country most affected by Islamist terrorism, ahead of Somalia and Iraq.

The countries most affected by Islamist terrorism are Afghanistan (17,075 attacks), Somalia (10,768 attacks), Iraq (8,209 attacks), Nigeria (3,950 attacks), Syria (3,421), Pakistan (2,635), Mali (2,289 attacks), Israel (1,748 attacks), Yemen (1,657 attacks), Algeria (1,387 attacks), Egypt (1,367 attacks), Mozambique (1,302 attacks) and Cameroon (1,230 attacks).

In these thirteen countries, 218,734 deaths were caused by Islamist terrorist attacks, representing 87.5% of the total number of deaths worldwide.

7. The indirect confrontation in Afghanistan between the American and Soviet powers is one of the major causes of Islamist violence of the 21st century.

The United States and Russia have also been hit by jihadist terrorism. During the period 1979-April 2024, there were 60 attacks in the United States and 3,121 deaths, and 86 attacks in Russia, resulting in 988 deaths.

8. The military is the main target (34%) of Islamist terrorists, ahead of civilians (27.7%) and police forces (15.3%).

- 1979-2000: military (343 attacks, 15.6 %), civilians (530 attacks, 24.1%), police forces (408 attacks, 18.6 %).

- 2001-2012: military (1,410 attacks, 17.1 %), civilians (2,506 attacks, 30.3 %), police forces (1,424, 17.2 %).
- 2013-April 2024 : military (20,556 attacks, 37.2%), civilians (15,111 attacks, 27.4%), police forces (8,217 attacks, 14.9%).

9. Most (86.3%) of Islamist terrorist attacks have occurred in Muslim countries¹. Similarly, the vast majority of deaths from Islamist terrorist attacks (88.9%) occurred in Muslim countries.

- Number of Islamist terrorist attacks in Muslim countries: 57,726 attacks (86.3% of Islamist terrorist attacks worldwide).
- Number of deaths caused by Islamist terrorist attacks in Muslim countries: 222,236 deaths (88.9% of deaths caused by Islamist terrorist attacks worldwide).

It should be noted that these figures underestimate the reality since they do not take into account the Islamist terrorist attacks perpetrated in countries with a non-Muslim majority where Muslim populations are concentrated in certain provinces. This is the case, for example, in southern Thailand, where Muslims are in the majority in the provinces of Satun, Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat, but also in the Philippines, in the region of Mindanao; in India, in the province of Jammu and Kashmir; and in China, in the Uyghur autonomous region of Xinjiang.

10. Over the entire period of time studied here, the Taliban was the deadliest group. Its terrorist actions resulted in the deaths of 71,965 people.

The deadliest terrorist organisations, taking into account their various offshoots, were the Taliban (71,965 deaths), the Islamic State group (69,641 deaths), Boko Haram (26,081 deaths), Al Shabaab (21,784 deaths), and al Qaeda (14,856 deaths). These five terrorist groups were responsible for more than three-quarters (81.8%) of the victims of Islamist terrorist attacks between 1979 and April 2024.

The accuracy of the figures cannot imply such detailed knowledge of the observed reality; the degree of precision results from the calculation operations applied to the database. We could only reproduce exactly the result of these operations.

1. Muslim countries: Afghanistan, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Djibouti, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, West Bank and Gaza Strip and Yemen.

*The data from Mozambique were not included as the databases used for this country do not allow us to identify the targets of the attacks.

An assessment of Islamist violence in the world (1979-April 2024)

Dominique Reynié, Executive Director of the Fondation pour l'innovation politique

Fondapol has undertaken a significant effort to quantify and analyze Islamist terrorism worldwide, which resulted in a first report published in 2019, followed by another in 2021. This is the third edition. The striking surge in Islamist violence in recent years made this updated edition necessary. U.S. President Joe Biden emphasized this in August 2021, following the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan and the Taliban's takeover of Kabul: 'The terrorist threat has metastasized around the globe, far beyond Afghanistan. We face threats from Al Shabaab in Somalia, al-Qaeda networks in Syria and the Arabian Peninsula, and ISIS attempting to create a caliphate in Syria and Iraq, and establishing networks in Africa and Asia.¹ Three years later, our data confirms the relevance of these remarks. The expansion of Islamist terrorism since 2012-2013 is undeniable, particularly in West Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle East, which was tragically illustrated by the Hamas attacks on Israeli territory on October 7, 2023.

The series of attacks on September 11, 2001 remains the deadliest in the history of terrorism, with 3,001 dead and 16,493 injured². However, the attacks of October 7, 2023 represent the second most deadly Islamist terrorist event, causing the death of at least 1,195 people, injuring more than 3,400, and organizing the kidnapping of 251³. These attacks were the largest against Israel on its own soil since its creation in 1948. The October 7 pogrom was characterized by unprecedented violence: assassinations, torture, rape and hostage-taking of women, children and the elderly. To date (31 August 2024), 98 hostages are still being held by Hamas.

In sub-Saharan Africa, the deadliest attack to date was the takeover of the town of Palma in Mozambique by the Islamic State between 24 March 2021 and

5 April 2021: 1,193 people were killed during the 13-day occupation of the town, and 209 were abducted. They are currently presumed dead.

In Europe (excluding Russia), since 1979, there have been 209 attacks and 802 deaths. In France, the worst-hit European country over the same period, there have been 85 Islamist terrorist attacks, resulting in 334 deaths. In addition to France, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom were also impacted, sometimes more than once. Russia is also a target of Islamist terrorism, with 86 attacks and 988 deaths between 1998 and April 2024. In 2024, Russia was hard hit by two particularly deadly Islamist attacks: the first, on March 22 in Moscow, killed at least 144 people and injured almost 550; the second, on June 23 in the province of Dagestan, killed around 20 and injured around 40. Nevertheless, it is outside the Western world that countries have suffered more often and even more severely from Islamist violence.

1. 1979, the critical year

We asked ourselves whether it was possible to truly know the extent of Islamist violence in the world, to make a database of it and to share the results with interested audiences in the form of a database accompanied by this study. To carry out such work, it was necessary first to determine the starting point of the database, to identify the most reliable sources, examine and validate them, then process the data collected, present the main lessons learned and, lastly, make the information collected available to the public.

1. "Transcript of Biden's Speech on the U.S. Withdrawal From Afghanistan", The New York Times, August 31, 2021 [online].

2. While 6,291 people were injured on the day of the attacks, thousands more suffered physical injuries, such as respiratory ailments or cancer, in the years following September 11, 2001, as documented by the World Trade Center Health Registry [online].

3. Figures from Humans Right Watch report, "I Can't Erase All the Blood from My Mind", Palestinian Armed Groups' October 7 Assault on Israel", 2024.

We decided to start collecting data from 1979 onwards. This year was chosen by most specialists because it reflects the historical failure of Arab nationalism competing with the movements of Islamisation and the affirmation of jihadism⁴. That same year, a number of events precipitated this development: the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, the Iranian revolution, the signing of the Camp David agreements and the hostage-taking of the Great Mosque of Mecca by a group of Islamist fundamentalists in November-December 1979⁵. For Gilles Kepel, what was happening that year was the result of “the fierce struggle between the Saudi monarchy and Khomeini’s Iran”⁶ but at the same time it was the time of a new indirect confrontation between the USSR and the United States: “The jihad financed in this country [Afghanistan] by the oil-monarchies of the Arabian Peninsula and the CIA is explicitly aimed at inflicting on the Soviet Union [...] a ‘Vietnam’ that precipitates its fall. At the Islamic level, its function is also to divert radical militants around the world from the struggle against the American Great Satan – to which Khomeini incites them – and to channel them against the USSR. Afghan jihad has a cardinal importance in the evolution of the Islamist movement around the world. It became the ultimate cause, with which all militants, moderate or radical, identify themselves. It supersedes, in the Arab imagination, the Palestinian cause and symbolises the transition from nationalism to Islamism”⁷.

2. Definition of terrorism

Like many concepts, terrorism is subject to controversial definitions. In this study, we define “terrorism” as political acts that meet the principle and criteria of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). In this context, a terrorist act is presented as “the threat of the effective use or use of unlawful force and violence by a non-state actor in order to achieve political, economic, religious or social objectives, through fear, coercion or intimidation”⁸. This definition is extended to the enumeration of a set of characteristics specifying the nature of the terrorist act:

- it must be intentional and result from a conscious calculation by the perpetrator;
- it must include some level of violence or threat of imminent violence, whether physical or material;
- the perpetrators of the incident must be non-state actors⁹.

To be included in the database, an event must also meet at least two of the following criteria:

- the violent act must have a political, economic, religious or social objective;
- the act must result from an intention of coercion, intimidation, or be motivated by the desire to spread an economic, political, religious or social message to a wider audience than that represented by the immediate victims; what matters is the intention of those who planned the attack or those who made the decision to carry it out;
- the action must be distinct from activities considered legitimate in time of war. The act must violate the framework defined by international humanitarian rules, in particular those concerning the prohibition of intentionally targeting civilians or non-combatants.

4. See Gilles Kepel, *Sortir du chaos. Les crises en Méditerranée et au Moyen-Orient*, Gallimard, 2018, p. 23-69.

5. In his report for the Institut Montaigne, Hakim El Karaoui sets out the reasons why, in his view, it is possible to consider that the autonomisation of jihadism took shape in Afghanistan, namely ‘the arrival of several Islamist groups united by the Afghan conflict, the financial autonomy of the Afghan mujahideen thanks to American and Saudi funding, the actual practice of jihad for the first time since the end of the nineteenth century and its theorisation by the Muslim Brother Abdallah Azzam’ (*La Fabrique de l’islamisme*, Institut Montaigne, September 2018, p. 63 [online]).

6. Gilles Kepel, *Jihad. Expansion et déclin de l’islamisme*, 2nd revised and updated ed., Gallimard, ‘Folio actuel’ series, 2003, p. 26.

7. Ibid.

8. « The threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation », Global Terrorism Database, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism (START), Université du Maryland, Codebook: Inclusion Criteria and Variables, juillet 2017, p. 10 [online].

9. According to this definition, acts of State terrorism are not included in our survey.

Our contribution focuses specifically on terrorist acts carried out by organisations or individuals claiming to be Islamists. The criterion defining a terrorist action and according to which “the violent act must pursue a political, economic, religious or social objective” must therefore be specified. This criterion is considered essential to our database and focuses on attacks that have been the subject of an Islamist claim or about which the available information indicates that it has been planned, decided and carried out in the name of Islamism.

3. Definition of Islamism

For historians, “Islamism” is a term “used at the end of the nineteenth century to designate Islam as a religion and civilisation, but which has recently taken a new meaning of militant fundamentalist, traditionalist and proselyte Islam”¹⁰. Islamism now refers to “a trend demanding the strict application of the prescriptions of religious or shari'a law, some of which have been abandoned, as well as the principles of faith, by various modern governments in Muslim countries, particularly under the influence of European countries, Western ideologies and reformist movements”¹¹. As a result of this evolution, the defenders of such a conception of Islam, the “Islamists”, advocate for a jihad that is “on the one hand, in their own country against ‘bad’ Muslims and corrupt rulers in order to establish, if necessary, a purely Islamic state, and on the other hand, more generally, against the secular values that dominate the non-Muslim world”¹². The same authors consider that Islamism has many analogies with the Muslim Brotherhood movement¹³.

There are many other definitions of Islamism, often very detailed. To complete without unduly complicating matters, one can refer in particular to the definition proposed by Edward Walker, because of its relative clarity and conciseness: “By ‘Islamism’, I mean the normative political ideology that has as its core program the establishment of Islam as a state religion and the implementation of Islamic law (shari'a). Militant Islamism, then, is any form of Islamism

that advocates the use of violence to achieve Islamist objectives. This same distinction is made by Islamists themselves, who refer to ‘Parties of the Islamic Call’, or al-da'wa al-Islamiyya (i.e., Islamist groups that do not advocate violence) on the one hand, and ‘Parties of the Muslim Revolution’, or al-thawra al-Islamiyya (i.e., Islamist groups that do advocate violence) on the other hand¹⁴. Acknowledging that there are no universally accepted definitions of Islamism and terrorism, some researchers characterise it as an ideology whose key tenets include:

- Belief that Islam is not only a religion, but also a holistic sociopolitical system;
- Advocacy of shari'a (Islamic) law as divine state law;
- Belief that a transnational Muslim community, known as the Ummah, should unite as a political bloc;
- Advocacy of an ‘Islamic’ state, or Caliphate, within which sovereignty belongs to God¹⁵.

4. A global database of Islamist terrorist attacks from 1979 to April 2024

It is within the framework of these definitions that we have conceived this work and that we propose here the result in the form of a database listing the Islamist terrorist attacks perpetrated in the world since 27 December 1979. The data included in our database does not extend beyond 12 April 2024, given the time required to validate and process the information collected. Indeed, while the attacks in Western countries have considerable visibility, due to the greater impact that violence can have in more peaceful societies, their ability to produce reliable data quickly and a particularly dense media presence, the same cannot be said for attacks that take place, much more often, in other parts of the world where all identification and intelligence processes become longer but cannot be as effective.

10. Janine Sourdél and Dominique Sourdél (eds.), *Dictionnaire historique de l'islam*, PUF, 1996, p. 411.

11. Ibid

12. Ibid

13. Ibid. See also Mehdi Mozaffari, “What is Islamism? History and Definition of a Concept”, *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*, vol. 8, no. 1, March 2007, p. 21.

14. “By ‘Islamism’, I mean the normative political ideology that has as its core program the establishment of Islam as a state religion and the implementation of Islamic law (shari'a). Militant Islamism, then, is any form of Islamism that advocates the use of violence to achieve Islamist objectives. This same distinction is made by Islamists themselves, who refer to “Parties of the Islamic Call,” or al-da'wa al-Islamiyya (i.e. Islamist groups that do not advocate violence) on the one hand, and “Parties of the Muslim Revolution,” or al-thawra al-Islamiyya (i.e. Islamist groups that do advocate violence)” (Edward W. Walker, ‘Islam, Islamism and Political Order in Central Asia’, *Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 56, no. 2, Spring 2003, p. 22, note 1).

15. See Robin Simcox, Hannah Stuart, Houriya Ahmed and Douglas Murray, “Islamist Terrorism. The British Connection”, *The Henry Jackson Society and The Centre for Social Cohesion*, 2nd ed. 2010, p. XVI [online].

Therefore, the validation and classification of relevant events requires work that goes beyond the time we had to define in order to make this publication possible.

To conduct our research, we relied on three types of sources: gathering information on attacks using search engines, cross-referencing existing databases, and consulting academic research. We used a range of databases that track both general attacks and specifically Islamist attacks¹⁶. All the databases we used were helpful in confirming and expanding our research¹⁷. However, most of these databases were incomplete or unevenly detailed. For some countries, regions, or time periods, there was a lot of information, but for others, the data was sparse or missing. For example, Wikipedia offers data organized by year or theme, but it is often fragmented and incomplete, making it unsuitable for statistical analysis. For our first edition, *"Islamist Attacks in the World 1979-2019,"* we primarily used the *Global Terrorism Database* (GTD) from the University of Maryland, USA¹⁸. This database covers terrorist attacks from 1970 to 2017. The value of this data set lies in its ability to record attacks, whatever their motivation.

This richness was also our main challenge, since we had to extract Islamist-type attacks from the 172,944 attacks recorded worldwide from 1979 to 2017. We therefore first had to select, verify and classify the data contained in the GTD. We then had to supplement it with our own information, in particular for the years 1993, 2018 and 2019¹⁹.

Since the first edition of our study, in November 2019, the University of Maryland database has been updated to June 2020. Firstly, we were able to consolidate our data for the years 2018 and 2019.

For the period from July 2020 to April 2024, we used the *Armed Conflict and Event Data Project* (ACLED) database. This American non-profit organization specializes in data collection and mapping of all types of violent events worldwide, from 1997 to the present day. We have developed a filtering system, with three parameters, to retain only Islamist attacks:

16. On April 28, 2019, the German newspaper *Welt am Sonntag* published a list of Islamist attacks. The list covers a shorter period, from September 11, 2001 to April 28, 2019. Up to 2017, the data is taken from the *Global Terrorism Database*. For the years 2018 and 2019, the journal has carried out its own census. Our data differs from that of *Welt am Sonntag* in at least three respects: firstly, we cover a period of forty years instead of eighteen, which enables us to track developments in Islamist terrorism, revealing in particular a phenomenon of globalization; secondly, *Welt am Sonntag* has chosen to count only attacks with at least twelve fatalities, whereas we ourselves have recorded all identifiable attacks; thirdly, *Welt am Sonntag* focused on attacks carried out by the main terrorist groups (Abdullah-Azzam Brigade, Asaib Ahl ab-Haqq, Abu Sayyaf, Ansar al-Din, Allied Democratic Forces, Algerian Jihadists, Ahrar al-Sham, Ansar al-Islam, Al-Ittihaad al-Islami, Al-Islah Party, Aisha-Brigade, Al-Aksa Martyrs Brigade, Al-Muaqoon-Biddam Brigade, Ansar-Al-Din-Front, al-Qaida, Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army, Ansar al-Sunna, al-Shabaab, Ansar al-Sharia, Ansar al-Tawhid, Ansar ul-Islam, Boko Haram, Sunni Jihadist Movement of Iran, Deccan Mujahideen, Guardians of Religion, Armed Islamic Group, Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, Hezbollah, Hizb-i-Islami, Harkatul Jihad-e-Islami, Hakkani Network, Halqa-e-Mehsud, Hisbul Mujahideen, Hamas, Houthis, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Islamic Jihad, Islamic Front, Indian Mujahideen, Turkestan Islamic Party, Jaish al-Adl, Jaish-al-Islam, Jamaat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, Jaish-e-Mohammad, Jaish al-Fatah, Jaish-i-Islam, Jemaah Islamiya, Jund al-Khilafah, Jamiat ul-Mujahedin, Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin, Jundallah, Jundallah Pakistan, Jaljala Army, Kataib Hezbollah, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Lashkar-e-Omar, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Lashkar-e-Islam, Mujahideen Ansar, Mahaz-e-Inqilab, Moro Islamic Liberation Front, Moro National Liberation Front, Movement for Tawheed and Jihad in West Africa, Mujahideen Shura Council, Armée Mukhtar, Front al Nosrah, Students Islamic Movement of India, Sipah-i-Mohammed, Salafia Jihadia, Shura des Moudjahidines de Derna, Special Purpose Islamic Regiment, Shura des révolutionnaires de Benghazi, Taliban, Tehrik-e-Taliban Islami, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, United Jihad Council); while our database lists, as accurately as possible, all Islamist attacks. So, in addition to attacks committed by the best-known groups, we also take into account attacks carried out by individuals or small groups claiming to be Islamists, without belonging to a particularly well-known organization. See "18 Jahre Terror", *Welt am Sonntag*, no. 17, April 28, 2019, pp. 12-14.

17. We can quote, for example, the database made available by *Le Monde* on Islamic State group attacks from 2014 to 2016 [online], journalist Alexander Perry [online].

18. *Global Terrorism Database*, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism (START), University of Maryland [online].

19. The *Global Terrorism Database* did not provide information for 1993. The years 2018 and 2019 were not available from the GTD.

- 1. The period:** we have exported data for the period from 1 July, 2020 to 12 April, 2024;
- 2. Type of event:** we then selected all terrorist attacks worldwide;
- 3. Islamist terrorist groups:** finally, we have kept track of attacks perpetrated by an Islamist terrorist or by an Islamist terrorist group, with 656 Islamist terrorist groups recorded from 1979 to the present day.

We have excluded several types of events from our database:

- Operations initiated by state forces aimed at preemptively weakening a terrorist group (e.g., "On 12 March 2021, 3 Taliban were killed and 1 wounded in an Afghan military operation in Dih Yak district, Ghazni province. Additionally, 4 Taliban-planted IEDs were detected and defused in the district. Fatalities coded as 3")²⁰.
- Operations where the instigator is not clearly identifiable (e.g., "On 18 September 2021, clashes erupted between AQAP militants and unidentified tribesmen in Al Tariyah village, Hatib district (Shabwah), killing 1 and injuring others. The reason behind the clashes was not reported")²¹.

For the Islamist attacks included in our database, we have provided the following information:

- the date ;
- the location of the attack: country, city, exact location when identifiable;
- the number of confirmed deaths and the number of wounded, including among the attackers; it is important to point out here that the number of wounded is obviously greatly underestimated by the information available;
- the perpetrator(s) of the attack ;
- target type(s) ;
- the type(s) of attack(s) involved;
- type(s) of weapon(s) used.
- description of the attack.

For the period June 2021-April 2024, we analyzed a total of 18,188 events, representing an average of 527 terrorist acts per month. We have worked with information provided by the *Armed Conflict and Event Data Project* (ACLED) to analyze it and create our own database²².

5. Why our study underestimates the reality of Islamist violence

It is obviously not possible to claim to offer an exhaustive database of Islamist attacks committed worldwide between 1979 and April 2024, for a number of reasons detailed below.

A certain number of attacks have not been listed.

Despite our best efforts, it has not been possible to identify a certain number of Islamist attacks over the entire period in question.

a/ In some cases, the number of victims caused by Islamist attacks is insufficiently detailed. It is sometimes roughly estimated by the authorities of the country who, for political reasons, do not wish to collect and publish information on the subject. This is particularly the case with the Algerian state (see our box below).

b/ A number of attacks do not appear in our "retained estimate" when religious motivation is not clearly predominant in a combination involving another determination. Islamist terrorism takes place in singular and complex contexts that sometimes make it difficult to collect reliable data. This is particularly the case in situations of war, civil or international, independentist or separatist struggles and territorial conflicts that persist over long periods of time, where causalities are shifting or inextricable, as in the case of the Palestinian conflict, while in a completely different context, in Thailand for example, a separatist movement has led a Muslim minority to get involved with weapons in the name of objectives that can achieve, beyond political demands, a religious dimension.

c/ Islamist motivation is not always identified.

Available data do not always allow news agencies to attribute the attack to the Islamist cause, especially if the country affected by the attack is characterised by weak administrative structures. The absence of claim of responsibility can increase the likelihood that an attack will not even be recorded by agencies or that this information will not reach the press.

d/ The number of deferred deaths is practically unknown. However, it is certainly significant. Since victims who succumb to their injuries after an attack are almost never mentioned in the available information, it is impossible to know their exact number.

20. Extract from the Fondapol database 1979-2024.

21. Ibid.

22. As the ACLED database is regularly updated, we were able to modify some data from before 2021—these updates are minor.

The death of Tahar Mejri, who died of grief on June 14, 2019, three years after losing his wife and son in the Nice attack on July 14, 2016, is another tragic illustration of what we refer to as 'delayed deaths'. It is therefore also impossible to integrate these deaths into our database in a reliable way. Thus, according to our database, we record at least 249,941 deaths and 192,598 people wounded, which is less than the number of deaths. However, if we consider four cases of attacks, each carried out with different means, in three countries where the quality of information is excellent, we observe a completely opposite ratio between the number of deaths and the number of people wounded: in the United States, there were five times as many people wounded (16,493) than killed (3,001) in the 9/11 attacks; in France, there were three times as many people wounded (413) than killed (137) in the 13 November 2015 attacks; in Nice, in the 14 July 2016 attack, there were five times as many people wounded (458) than killed (87). In Israel, the attacks of October 7th, 2023, resulted in 3,400 injured and at least 1,195 dead, hence in three times more deaths than injuries. It should be noted here that both the Bataclan attack and the Nice attack led to survivors committing suicide several months or even years after the events. Our study goes back on this particular point. This information leads us to believe that the number of people wounded is much higher than that in our database. Certainly, developing countries, which are the countries where most attacks take place, do not have the same capacity to identify and care for people injured in an attack. Some of the injured are probably not even counted, while others die from their injuries after a certain period of time due to the inadequacy or fragility of relief systems and health institutions. If we applied the ratios of the four sample attacks to the number of casualties in our database (249,941), we would have to adjust this figure by multiplying it by three (hence 749,823 wounded) or five (hence 1,249,705). However, among all these injured people, it appears certain that several of them die from their injuries, and that the poorer and more lacking in rescue and medical resources the affected country is, the more numerous these deaths are.

For these four reasons, we propose two types of quantification of Islamist violence, in the form of a "retained estimate" and a "possible estimate". The "retained estimate" results from our database of attacks during the period 1979-April 2024, that were clearly motivated by an Islamist agenda. The "possible estimate" results from the identification of attacks that could be qualified as Islamist, including certain terrorist acts that are also based on separatist, political or social logic, which make it more difficult to attribute them to an exclusively or mainly Islamist motivation. In all cases, the number of victims, dead or injured, is significantly lower than a reality that cannot be more precisely known.

We have recorded 66,872 Islamist terrorist attacks that killed at least 249,941 people between 1979 and April 2024.

Number of attacks [estimate retained]	66,872
Number of attacks [possible estimate]	78,705
Number of deaths [estimate retained]	249,941
Number of deaths [possible estimate]	271,892
Number of wounded [strong underestimation]	192,598

"The possible estimate" should be between 300,000 and 400,000 deaths considering the victims of Islamist terrorism in Algeria, according to the hypotheses based on the best-known sources and the most reliable studies.

Our research began in spring 2018. It gave rise to a first publication, in 2019²³, and a second in 2021²⁴. The study we publish here is based on the database we developed, within the limits previously indicated. The analyses that follow first present the evolution of Islamist terrorism from 1979 to the present day, before proposing a presentation and reading of the data according to the regions of the world and the countries affected by Islamist violence.

23. Dominique Reynié (dir.), Les attentats islamistes dans le monde 1979-2019, Fondation pour l'innovation politique, November 2019 [online].
24. Dominique Reynié (dir.), Les attentats islamistes dans le monde 1979-2021, Fondation pour l'innovation politique, September 2021 [online].

The Algerian “black decade”: only an approximation is possible

The Algerian case illustrates particularly well the difficulty of providing an exhaustive database. Algerians refer to the period between 1991 and 2002 as the “black decade”, when various Islamist groups, in particular the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) and the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), opposed the Algerian state in a violent civil war whose outcome is difficult to document¹. According to Fouad Ajami, “the precise number of Algerians who died in the civil war that broke out in 1992 will never be known. The Algerian leaders, who are not known for their loyalty to the truth and who have so much to hide, acknowledged in 1999 that 100,000 people were killed. More reliable estimates provided by Algerian civic organisations put the death toll at 200,000”². Indeed, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika first estimated the number of victims at 100,000 in 1999. Then, in February 2005, the Algerian president gave a speech in which he put the figure at 150,000 deaths³. Fouad Ajami considers that the death toll could reach 200,000, arguing that it was in the interest of the Algerian government to minimise the losses⁴. This figure, which has been used in various works on terrorism in Algeria⁵, remains debated, particularly because it does not distinguish between victims who were members of the police or the army, terrorists and civilians. In a study published in 2008, Roman Hagelstein tried to distinguish between those killed in clashes between security forces and terrorists and those killed in massacres, bombings and assassinations. The study also distinguishes the number of missing persons, presumed to have been murdered in secret, with the author estimating the total number of victims at 44,000⁶. Regarding the victims of Algerian Islamist terrorism in the period 1991-2002, the available estimates that can be considered reliable because of the sources, authors and types of publication thus vary between 44,000 and 200,000. In any case, for this country and for this period, there is no data available to provide information on the number of attacks, their date, the modalities of action, the group responsible or the profile of the victims. For our database, these major uncertainties have several consequences: firstly, due to the lack of information, it is not possible to further specify the situation of Islamist terrorism in Algeria during this decade. In keeping with our method, we therefore only include in the “retained data” the cases that were reported. This choice leads to an undoubtedly significant underestimation of the number of attacks and victims in Algeria. On the other hand, we will include in the “possible estimate” category the indications concerning Algeria. Finally, as a consequence, this situation of great ignorance with regard to the Algerian case leads to an underestimation of the number of attacks and victims of Islamist terrorism in the world, both for the period after 1991 and for the period as a whole.

1. See Pierre Daum, “Mémoire interdite en Algérie”, *Le Monde diplomatique*, August 2017, p. 8-9 [online].

2. Fouad Ajami, “The Furrows of Algeria”, *newrepublic.com*, 27 January 2010 [online].

3. “Algeria puts strife toll at 150,000”, *aljazeera.com*, 23 February 2005 [online].

4. Fouad Ajami, *art. cit.*

5. See the pages “Algeria” on the website *counterextremism.com*; Audra Grant, “The Algerian 2005 Amnesty: The Path to Peace?”, *Terrorism Monitor*, vol. 3, n° 22, November 2017; “Algeria: Fundamentalist Conflict, 1980s-Present”, in James Ciment (dir.), *World terrorism. An Encyclopedia of Political Violence. Ancient Times to the Post-9/11 era*, Routledge, 2011, vol. I, p. 157.

6. Roman Hagelstein, “Explaining the Violence Pattern of the Algerian Civil War”, *HiCN Working Paper*, n° 43, March 2008 [online].

I. The beginnings of transnational Islamist terrorism (1979-2000)

This work does not aim to shed light on the foundations of Islamism or to discuss the origins and justifications, in the context of Islam, of the use of violence and violence of a terrorist nature in particular. In a different way, we consider that our contribution lies in the information that can be obtained from the exploitation of a consolidated database and the analyses to which it can give rise. However, in order to understand the value of the data shared here, it is necessary to briefly recall the developments in Islamist terrorism since 1979.

Until the mid-1970s, Islamism had little influence in the Middle East and North Africa. In the wake of decolonisation and the rejection of Western imperialism, the new States of the region affirm a nationalist and pan-Arab vision promoted by leaders such as Nasser or Boumediene and by movements such as Ba'ath, in Syria and Iraq, or the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) in Palestine. Islamist organisations are firmly contained or severely repressed, as Nasser did in Egypt with the Muslim Brotherhood. Founded in 1928 by Hassan el-Banna, the Muslim Brotherhood was established with the aim of restoring the political Islam that had disappeared with the abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate proclaimed by Atatürk in 1924.

At the end of the 1970s, the Islamist claim was strengthened¹. The increase in social inequalities and corruption of the elites were denounced. Islamist movements were trying to embody a political alternative to existing dictatorships or were engaging in violent actions, as in Syria, where the Muslim Brotherhood launched an armed struggle against the Baathist regime of Hafez el-Assad. These movements of Islamisation in Middle Eastern societies flourished all the more as Arab nationalism began to falter then collapsed. At the end of the decade, in 1979, a window of opportunity opened up for Islamists in the Middle East and North Africa.

1. The Soviet-Afghan war, “matrix of contemporary Islamist terrorism”

The year 1979 was a pivotal year, the scene of several important events, including the Iranian revolution and the invasion of Afghanistan by the USSR. The Russian military operation precipitated the emergence of a new Islamism. At the same time, in Iran, the opposition led by the Shiite clergy, due to the context of intense social protest, forced the Shah to flee the country (16 January 1979). On 1 February 1979, Ruhollah Khomeyni came to power. He initiated the transformation of Iran's imperial regime, accused of “Westernisation”, into an Islamic republic. In the wake of the Iranian revolution, Shia groups advocating armed struggle were formed. Among them is the Lebanese Hezbollah, created in 1982. Shia ideology is affirmed in the context of the process of Islamisation of the Middle East where it competes with Sunni legitimacy.

In Afghanistan, the Soviet invasion initiates the conflict which will be considered the matrix of contemporary Islamist terrorism². *Jihad* is supported by Saudi Arabia, Algeria and Egypt. Jihadists who reach Afghanistan become “mujahideen”; they are seen as the liberators of a “land of Islam” (*dar al-islam*).

1. See Mohamed Louizi, *Liberer islam de l'islamisme*, Fondation pour l'innovation politique, January 2018 [online] ; Mohamed Sifaoui, *Taqiyya! Comment les Frères musulmans veulent infiltrer la France*, L'Observatoire, 2019; or Malik Bezouh, *Crise de la conscience arabo-musulmane*, Fondation pour l'innovation politique, September 2015 [online].

2. See Gilles Kepel, “Le terrorisme islamiste est né en Afghanistan”, remarks collected by Héloïse Kolebka, *L'Histoire*, n° 293, December 2004, p. 18-19 [online].

2. The 1980s and the emergence of Islamist terrorism


With 357 attacks, which cost the lives of 1,442 people, the 1980s are the least deadly years compared to the decades that followed. The emergence of Islamist terrorism is visible from the years 1980-1983 which correspond to the Muslim Brotherhood's activism in Syria, in the midst of an uprising against the government of Hafez el-Assad.

From 1980 to 1982, there were 69 attacks on Syrian territory, representing nearly two-thirds (63.3%) of all Islamist terrorist attacks listed in the world during these three years. Attacks ceased after the repression of the Muslim Brotherhood movement, including during the Hama massacres by the Syrian army in 1982.

Islamist terrorist attacks in the world (1979-2000)

— Number of deaths
— Number of attacks

As the data for 1993 have to be consolidated, they are not included in this graph.




From 1980 to 1989, the country most affected by Islamist terrorism is Lebanon, with 133 attacks, which caused at least 515 deaths. In the grips of a civil war since 1975, the country has been experiencing the rise of small terrorist groups. This unstable national context and Israel's invasion of southern Lebanon in 1982 promote, the same year, the emergence of Hezbollah. A year later, the Shia organisation triggered a series of attacks on foreign institutions. An Italian patrol was hit on 15 March 1983, although no lives were lost, but on 18 April a new attack hit the United States Embassy in Beirut, resulting in the deaths of 63 people. At the end of the same year, on 23 October, an American base and a French patrol were terribly hit by an attack in which 299 people lost their lives. Hezbollah's terrorist activism is particularly intense in Lebanon, where it committed 276 attacks from 1983 to 2000, but it is not limited to this. In all, by integrating the other affected countries, Hezbollah is responsible for 339 attacks from 1983 to 2000, killing 1,105 people. Saudi Arabia, Argentina, Cyprus, Denmark, Egypt, Greece, Israel, Kuwait and Tunisia are among the affected countries.

In September 1986, Paris suffered a series of six attacks, including the one on 17 September, rue de Rennes, in front of a store, which killed 7 people and injured 55.


These attacks were claimed by the Solidarity Committee with Arab political prisoners and the Near East, on behalf of the Lebanese Hezbollah.

The Lebanese organisation is also considered responsible for the two attacks on the Israeli Embassy on 17 March 1992 in Buenos Aires (30 deaths, 220 wounded), as well as the attack of 18 July 1994 on a Jewish association, also in Buenos Aires (85 deaths, 236 injured). Over the whole 1979-April 2024 period, Argentina remains the only country in South America affected by Islamist terrorism, with three attacks.

Types of weapons used in Islamist attacks (1979-2000)



*As the available information on recorded attacks may be incomplete, the total number of attacks by weapon type does not equal 100%.



COUNTRIES AFFECTED BY ISLAMIST TERRORISM (1979-2000)

1 ALGERIA

604 attacks | 2,655 deaths

2 LEBANON

348 attacks | 737 deaths

3 EGYPT

311 attacks | 551 deaths

4 PHILIPPINES

195 attacks | 516 deaths

5 INDIA

104 attacks | 339 deaths

6 WEST BANK AND THE GAZA STRIP

87 attacks | 99 deaths

7 SYRIA

72 attacks | 422 deaths

8 IRAN

66 attacks | 24 deaths

9 ISRAEL

62 attacks | 176 deaths

10 INDONESIA

44 attacks | 26 deaths

11 PAKISTAN

32 attacks | 160 deaths

12 THAILAND

27 attacks | 24 deaths

13 TURKEY

26 attacks | 69 deaths

14 BANGLADESH

25 attacks | 33 deaths

15 FRANCE

24 attacks | 32 deaths

16 IRAQ

21 attacks | 139 deaths

17 AFGHANISTAN

19 attacks | 29 deaths

18 KUWAIT

16 attacks | 16 deaths

19 UNITED STATES

10 attacks | 7 deaths

20 CYPRUS

8 attacks | 1 death

21 YEMEN

7 attacks | 27 deaths

22 SAUDI ARABIA

6 attacks | 90 deaths

23 MOROCCO

6 attacks | 5 deaths

24 JORDAN

6 attacks | 0 death

25 NIGER

5 attacks | 178 deaths

26 SPAIN

5 attacks | 20 deaths

27 TUNISIA

5 attacks | 7 deaths

28 KENYA

4 attacks | 224 deaths

29 SOMALIA

4 attacks | 5 deaths

30 UNITED KINGDOM


4 attacks | 3 deaths

31 ARGENTINA

3 attacks | 115 deaths

32 ETHIOPIA

3 attacks | 7 deaths



33 TAJIKISTAN
3 attacks | 3 deaths

34 GERMANY
3 attacks | 0 death

35 SUDAN
2 attacks | 22 deaths

36 GREECE
2 attacks | 11 deaths

37 RUSSIA
2 attacks | 2 deaths

38 BELGIUM
2 attacks | 1 death

39 DENMARK
2 attacks | 1 death

40 ITALY
2 attacks | 1 death

41 KYRGYZSTAN
2 attacks | 1 death

42 BAHRAIN
2 attacks | 0 death

43 MALAYSIA
2 attacks | 0 death

44 MALI
1 attack | 14 deaths

45 TANZANIA
1 attack | 11 deaths

46 BURMA
1 attack | 8 deaths

47 LIBYA
1 attack | 2 deaths

48 SOUTH AFRICA
1 attack | 1 death

49 CROATIA
1 attack | 1 death

50 NEPAL
1 attack | 1 death

51 SWITZERLAND
1 attack | 1 death

52 AUSTRIA
1 attack | 0 death

53 NIGERIA
1 attack | 0 death

54 NORWAY
1 attack | 0 death


3. The 1990s and the spread of Islamist terrorism in the Middle East and North Africa

The withdrawal of the Red Army from Kabul on 5 February 1989 galvanised Islamist mobilisation, already stimulated in 1987 by the creation of Al-Qaeda, by Abdullah Azzam and Osama bin Laden. The globalisation of the jihadist struggle began then. The discourse is mainly based on the idea of a unified Muslim community (*ummah*) claiming autonomy from the ethnic, national and cultural specificities of each nationality. The objective is to establish the Caliphate and the exemplary prophetic city, which must also be extended to non-Muslim countries. The empowerment of the jihadist discourse in relation to classical, nationalist and political referents is not the hallmark of Al-Qaeda. It is taken up by all Muslims who came to Afghanistan to take part in the violent action. Following the Soviet withdrawal, these mujahideen returned to their countries of origin and spread the ideas of Jihadist Salafism there. Thus, in the 1990s, an increasing number of countries, particularly in the Middle East, were directly affected by Islamist violence.

In Algeria, a number of jihadists gathered in militant groups since the beginning of the 1991-2002³ civil war. The victory of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in the 1990 municipal elections and the 1991 parliamentary elections, followed by the cancellation of these elections by the Algerian army and the resignation of President Chadli Bendjedid, triggered a “black decade”. Military and Islamist groups engaged in a terrifying struggle for power. The confrontation devastated the country. From 1990 to 1999, Algeria was the country that was hit the hardest by Islamist terrorism. There were 542 attacks, or more than a third (34.6%) of the attacks recorded worldwide during this decade by our database; there were at least 2,390 deaths, representing more than half (51.4%) of the victims of Islamist terrorism in the world between 1990 and 1999. The violence reached its peak in 1997: 967 people were killed following the parliamentary elections won by the Rassemblement national démocratique (RDN), supported by the army.

Deadliest terrorist groups in Algeria (1979-2000)

As a % of the number of victims of the attacks committed in Algeria during this period



During this “black decade”, religious figures and institutions were particularly affected, particularly Christians of foreign nationalities: twelve Croatian tourists were murdered on 14 December 1993, two Spanish nuns were killed on 23 October 1994 and seven French monks from Tibhirine were kidnapped and murdered in the spring of 1996.

Targets of Islamist terrorist attacks in Algeria (1979-2000)

Type of target	Number of attacks
Civilians	169
Police	152
Government	43
Military	40
Business	40
Educational institutions	37
Journalists and media	33
Telecommunications	16
Religious institutions	10

In Egypt, on the eve of the 2000s, the Islamist landscape was structured by two movements: al-Jihad and al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya. The objective of these two organisations was the establishment of an Islamic State, and the means to achieve this was terrorism⁴. In the 1990s, al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya launched 257 insurgent attacks against the government, killing 489 people.


3. Due to a lack of information, it is not possible to specify the situation of Islamist terrorism in Algeria during this decade. In keeping with our method, we therefore only include in the “retained data” the cases that were reported. This choice leads to an undoubtedly significant underestimation of the number of attacks and victims in Algeria.

4. See Amr Hamzawy and Sarah Grebowski, “From Violence to Moderation. Al-Jama’a al-Islamiya and al-Jihad”, Carnegie Papers, n° 20, April 2010 [online].


In the Middle East, the 1990s were marked by the Islamisation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A transfer of power of sorts took place to the benefit of Hamas, a Palestinian Islamist movement born in 1987 at the beginning of the first Intifada, and to the detriment of the PLO, which came from the Arab nationalist movement. This evolution led to a change in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In 1992, 417 leaders and activists of Hamas were arrested and taken to southern Lebanon, in the village of Marj al-Zuhur, after the assassination of an Israeli officer. A resolution of the Council of UN security necessitated their repatriation. This event is analysed by Gilles Kepel as "the transition which gave Hamas parity with the PLO, if not primacy, for the incarnation of the Palestinian cause, and consequently the Islamisation of its Arab and universal image"⁵. Beyond the political vicissitudes on Palestinian territory, "the increase in suicide attacks - in the face of the hardening of successive governments of Mr. Netanyahu and the intensification of colonisation - can be considered as the model for the mirror of which the international jihadism of Al-Qaeda would develop its preferred mode of action"⁶.

In our database, we clearly observe an increase in the number of attacks affecting the Israeli and Palestinian territories from the beginning of the 1990s. Terrorist attacks are largely incriminating to Hamas but also to the Palestinian Islamic Jihad Group (PIJ). Between 1979 and 2000, of the 62 attacks recorded on Israeli ground, 29 were claimed by Hamas and 13 by the PIJ. Out of 87 attacks in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 65 were claimed by Hamas and 12 by the PIJ.

Types of attacks in Israel (1979-2000)



Types of attacks in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (1979-2000)



4. The export of *jihad*

Islamist violence has been on the rise in the Middle East and in North Africa from the 1980s onwards, and other regions of the world are also becoming hosts to this *jihad*, particularly Southeast Asia (Philippines), South Asia (India) and Europe.

Islamist violence in the world (1979-2000)

Region	Number of attacks	Number of deaths	Average number of deaths per attack
World	2,194	6,817	3.1
Middle East and North Africa	1,646	5,019	3.0
Southeast Asia	269	574	2.1
South Asia	181	562	3.1
Europe	58	74	1.4
Sub-Saharan Africa	22	462	21.0
North America	10	7	0.7

Rapid empowerment and the increasing power of Islamism eventually raise fears of countries that have nevertheless worked for this movement or who used it for domestic political reasons or international relations. Thus, in the face of the Islamist threat, Saudi Arabia and Algeria have engaged in relentless repression. This is also the case for Egypt and Syria. In a decade, Salafists have changed categories: firstly admired as "freedom fighters", they were then denounced as "fugitives"⁷.

5. Gilles Kepel, *Sortir du chaos...*, op. cit., p. 102.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 99.

7. See Dominique Thomas, *Le Londonistan. La voix du djihad*, Michalon, 2003, p. 70.

This regional context forced many jihadists into exile: some, having returned from Afghanistan, became political refugees, often with the aim of exporting their Islamist struggle to new territories, including those that are not predominantly Muslim. They sought asylum in Europe. In the 1990s, these territories of settlement and conquest were first England and France. London thus became a hub for Salafist Jihadist activism in Europe⁸. Between July and October 1995, France was hit by a wave of Islamist terrorist attacks related to the Algerian context: on 25 July 1995 an attack in the Parisian metro resulted in the deaths of 7 people and 86 people wounded.

Asia was also hit hard between 1979 and 2000, particularly in the south and southeast. According to our database, we record the first Islamist terrorist attacks in India in 1986. The phenomenon remained sporadic until 1990. In that year, 12 attacks were carried out under the leadership of the *Hizbul Mujahideen* (HM) group and its supporters. The action of this Islamist group was rooted in the conflict between India and Pakistan over the border region of Jammu and Kashmir, but if the group wanted the region to be integrated into Pakistan, it was also campaigning for the establishment of a caliphate in the world.

The landscape of Islamist terrorism in India is fragmented: a number of groups revolve around the issue of independence, including *Allah's Tigers* ("Tigers of Allah"), the Muslim Brotherhood, Harkat ul-Ansar and Jamaat-e-Islami. Between 1979 and 2000, most attacks (78.8%) were concentrated in Jammu and Kashmir. Since 2000 and the creation of the terrorist group Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), attacks have been both more numerous and more deadly (25 attacks and 126 deaths in 2000, 42 attacks and 200 deaths in 2001). These years also saw the Pakistani Taliban (*Lashkar-e-Taiba*) conducting terrorist campaigns in India.

In the Philippines, Islamist terrorism is deployed as part of the separatist struggle of the Moro people, a Muslim minority in the south of the country. One of the main terrorist groups in the region, the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), founded in 1991 by Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani, drew its inspiration from Islamist movements in the Middle East. The first demonstration of this terrorist movement occurred on 7 September 1986, when the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) attacked a Catholic church and a marriage ceremony in Salvador, on the island of Mindanao, killing 20 people and injuring 186. The group launched an attack on 15 January 1987 in the Manila metro, the capital, killing 8 people. In 1994, after an eclipse of sorts, the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) carried out 7 attacks in the south of the country. It later became one of the main actors of Islamist terrorism in the Philippines in the following decades.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 62. On Salafist Jihadist activism in the United Kingdom, see also Dominique Reynié, *Les Nouveaux Populismes*, Paris, Fayard/Pluriel, 2013, in particular the second part ("The conflict of identities") and in particular its chapter 3, "Sharia law in Europe?", p. 97.

The many faces of terrorism

Singular political violence that some authors trace back to Antiquity¹, terrorism finds in the changes of the late nineteenth century new resources capable of multiplying power tenfold: ideology favours the recruitment of terrorists and their determination to act, technological developments provide increasingly powerful means of destruction, at the same time more manageable and easier to hide, and the advent of the newspaper and photography ensures visibility that gives terrorist actions a new impact.

At the end of the 19th century, terrorism was dominated by secular causes: revolutionaries, anarchists and socialists, nationalists and separatists constituted the bulk of terrorist troops. Some attacks seem to be part of greater history, such as the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Austro-Hungarian Empire, on 28 June 1914 in Sarajevo. For a century, until the end of the 1980s, tens of thousands of attacks overflowed the news, taking place in the context of conflicts that were part of nationalist or revolutionary logic, sometimes both. Examples include: the attacks in Algeria or France by the National Liberation Front (FLN) and the OAS; around the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, those carried out by the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) or the Black September Organisation, responsible in particular for the massacre of members of the Israeli sports delegation on 5 September 1972 during the Munich Olympic Games; those of Irish paramilitary organisations, in particular the Irish Republican Army (IRA); those of independentists, Catalans, Basques, Corsicans or Bretons; the actions of the Red Brigades in Italy, including the kidnapping and murder in 1978 of former Council President Aldo Moro, or, two years later, in 1980, the attack on Bologna railway station (85 deaths, 200 wounded) attributed to an extreme right-wing organisation, the Revolutionary Armed Nuclei (NAR); the murders in Germany of the Red Army Faction, found responsible for the deaths of 34 people between 1970 and 1998; the attacks and kidnappings in France of the Action Directe group, which claimed more than 80 attacks between 1979 and 1987, including the assassination of industrialist Georges Besse in 1986²; the actions of the Japanese Red Army (JRA); the guerrilla actions of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia People's Army (FARC-EP) or the Peruvian organisation Shining Path; the massacres of the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka between 1976 and 2009...

Secular causes dominated terrorism until the late 1980s. After that date, there has been an increase in the power of Islamic-inspired terrorism. For several years now, Islamism has become the main motivation for terrorism³. According to our data, between January 2013 and June 2020, Islamist terrorist attacks (29,528) accounted for 32.1% of all attacks (91,994) worldwide but accounted for 145,225 deaths (65.3%) out of a total of 222,341 people killed.

1. See Gérard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin (eds.), *Histoire du terrorisme de l'Antiquité à Daech*, Fayard, 2015; Franklin L. Ford, *Le Meutre politique. Du tyrannicide au terrorisme* [1985], PUF, 1990; Mario Turchetti, *Tyrannie et tyrannicide de l'Antiquité à nos jours*, PUF, 2001; Monique Cottret, *Tuer le tyran ? Le tyrannicide dans l'Europe moderne*, Fayard, 2009; Isabelle Sommier, *Le Terrorisme*, Flammarion, coll. "Dominos", 2000; Henry Laurens and Mireille Delmas-Marty (dir), *Terrorismes. Histoire et droit*, CNRS Éditions, 2010.

2. On the Italian and French cases, see Isabelle Sommier, *La Violence politique et son deuil. L'après-68 en France et en Italie*, Presses universitaires de Rennes, 1998.

3. Data on all terrorist attacks worldwide is only available on the University of Maryland's database, which has been updated through June 2020.



II. The turning point of 9/11 (2001-2012)

The attacks of 9/11 2001 perpetrated by Al-Qaeda on U.S. soil were the deadliest terrorist attacks in history, with a total of 3,001 deaths and 16,493 wounded. On that day, two hijacked airliners were launched against the towers of the World Trade Center in New York. A third aircraft had been directed at the Pentagon in Washington. On board the fourth hijacked aircraft, it was a passenger revolt that defeated the terrorists' plan, as the aircraft crashed in the countryside in Pennsylvania.

The live and global broadcasting of this dramatic and spectacular event¹ also marked the beginning of a new era in the media coverage of terrorism. In addition to the deferred information intended for specific audiences, immediate and comprehensive information is now available. This new public space profoundly affects the work of traditional media (television, press and radio). The advent of social media and smartphones is opening its doors of mass communication to countless new players, starting with terrorist organisations.

Islamism and populism: a relentless dialectic

Terrorist violence mainly affects civilians. It reaches them at the heart of their ordinary lives, a world where no one has any reason to be on guard. Anytime, anywhere, anyone. Death due to terrorism creates an unbearable sense of permanent vulnerability. For a few days, a few weeks and sometimes longer, peace looks like war. People in the democratic world are more traumatised by terrorist violence because they have inherited an irenic culture, a logical consequence of the decline of interstate violence¹. But democracies are also more helpless because they represent a soft political order based on freedom and human rights. Inevitably, in the face of terrorist violence and a war imposed on all, democracies feel defenseless.

Stupor, despondency and fear upset political demands. A desire for repression, control, surveillance, expulsion and border closure is expressed in the open². It creates a culture of security, even paranoia, which is perpetuated by the inevitable measures designed to reassure much more than to prevent. Democracies are populated by countless systems of control to access public places and shops, gates and guards appear everywhere, street bins carry transparent bags. From now on, taking a plane requires heavy control and search procedures, going on the subway requires travellers to be vigilant, strategic locations are worrying and video surveillance is spreading, while the fight against terrorist networks intensifies police vigilance: files, wiretaps, tracking on the Web and social media, on video game forums, etc.

Through the violence of jihadists, Islam and Muslims are raising irrepressible and growing fears³. Fear of the other splits societies, and they end up opposing themselves: a propensity for violence, xenophobia, identity conflicts, and authoritarianism are the result. The common law is considered argumentative, cumbersome and cowardly⁴. A growing proportion of public opinion believes it is represented and reassured by leaders who promise to change the rule of law. When fear passes through the ballot boxes that democracy makes available, it becomes that force that undoes and rebuilds the law. The promise of illiberal democracy increases the attractiveness of populist programs⁵. Islamism and populism respond to and understand each other without having to talk to each other. They grow together and egg each other on⁶.

1. See Steven Pinker, *La Part d'ange en nous. Histoire de la violence et de son déclin* [2011], Les Arènes, 2017.

2. See the high level of trust that law enforcement institutions (Police, army and justice) enjoy in forty-two democracies, compared to the crisis that affects most institutions. See Mathieu Zagrodzki, "The army, police, and justice: strong support for institutions of law and order", in Dominique Reynié (dir.), *Democracies Under Pressure*, Fondation pour l'innovation politique, 2019, vol. I, pp. 97-98 [online].

3. In the 28 countries of the European Union, a large majority (57%) of respondents answered that they could "not welcome more refugees because they increase the risk of terrorism in our country". In the eleven countries of the former communist bloc that are now members of the European Union, this response concerns 72% of respondents (see Dominique Reynié, "The challenge of migration in the light of the refugee issue", in Dominique Reynié (dir.), op. cit., vol. I, pp. 52-56.)

4. See Antoine Garapon and Michel Rosenfeld, *Démocraties sous stress. Les défis du terrorisme global*, PUF, 2016.

5. Opinion in favour of an authoritarian form of government is reaching levels that exceed the electoral scores of populist parties. The level is higher the younger respondents are (see Dominique Reynié, "The ghosts of authoritarianism", in Dominique Reynié (dir.), op. cit., vol. I, pp. 39-40).

6. See Dominique Reynié, *Les Nouveaux Populismes*, ed. revised and expanded, Fayard/Pluriel, 2013.

1. Louis Gautier (dir.), *Mondes en guerre. Tome IV, Guerre sans frontières. 1945 à nos jours*, Éditions Passé composés/Humensis, Paris, 2021. See especially Louis Gautier, "Le temps des conflits", Chapter III, pp. 143-204.

1. 9/11 and the war on terror

The attacks of 9/11 have had a significant impact that changed the geopolitics of the Middle East². Qualified by George W. Bush's administration as the "war on terror", the American response was brisk. On 7 October 2001, the United States launched a major offensive against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, accused of having supported Al-Qaeda. A year and a half later, on 20 March 2003, the American army invaded Iraq, in order to overthrow Saddam Hussein's regime in the prospect of "democratising the Middle East". Despite overwhelming military victories, the United States is failing to restore peace, or to eradicate Islamism. Confronted with the machine of American war in the long term, Islamists organised themselves, by acquiring an international dimension that keeps being reaffirmed. Between 2001 and 2012, the number of attacks and victims have increased in a spectacular way, notably due to the attacks perpetrated by Taliban fundamentalists.

Their movement has been spreading in Afghanistan and in Pakistan since 1994. Two years later, they overthrew the government in place when Kabul was taken over. They established the regime of the Islamic Emirate from Afghanistan, headed by Mohammad Omar. In the years that followed, the Taliban persecuted minorities, established a well-founded regime on the strict application of shari'a law and welcomed numerous wanted jihadists, including the leader of Al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden.


In a few years, Afghanistan became a home for Islamic extremists from all over the world.

After the attacks of 9/11, the Taliban were driven out of power by an international coalition led by the Americans. From this moment on, there was an exponential increase in the number of attacks and the number of victims, in particular among international forces or members of the Afghan government. We went from 4 attacks and 153 deaths in the country in 2001 to 829 attacks and 2,604 deaths in 2012. In total, between 2001 and 2012, 2,536 attacks took place on Afghan soil, killing at least 8,054 people. This represents 30.7% of the total number of Islamist terrorist attacks worldwide between 2001 and 2012. The Taliban were responsible for most (95.2%) of these attacks.

The Taliban's targets in Afghanistan (2001-2012)

Type of target	Number of attacks	Breakdown by target (in %)
Police	592	23.3
Civilians	488	19.2
Government	452	17.8
Military	388	15.3
Business	140	5.5
Diplomacy	38	1.5
Religious institutions	38	1.5

Islamist terrorist attacks in Afghanistan (2001-2012)




2. According to a survey conducted by the Fondation pour l'innovation politique and the Fondation pour la Mémoire de la Shoah, of the seventeen events proposed, half of the young people surveyed (47%) cite the attacks of 9/11 as one of the three most significant events (see *Future Memories*, Fondation pour l'innovation politique and the Fondation pour la Mémoire de la Shoah, January 2015 [online]).

In Pakistan, we also witnessed the rise of groups multiplying terrorist acts between 2001 and 2012, with 1,010 attacks and 4,997 deaths. Very present in this country, the Taliban organised themselves from 2007 under the name Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP); they were responsible for nearly three-quarters (71.1%) of the terrorist violence over this period (2001-2012). Other Islamist groups are also active, such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (56 attacks, 386 deaths) or

Lashkar-e-Islam (64 attacks, 115 deaths). In 2007, two terrorist attacks led by Al-Qaeda and its allies left their mark on the landscape of the country's politics: on 18 October, an attack against a crowd gathered to welcome the former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, returning from exile, caused the death of 141 people and wounded 250. On 27 December, she was murdered in turn, victim of a suicide attack that killed 20 people and wounded more than a hundred.


Islamist terrorist attacks in Pakistan (2001-2012)



Between 2001 and 2012, Iraq was the third largest country most affected by Islamist terrorism, with 914 attacks. Particularly violent, these attacks caused the deaths of 8,534 people, with on average 9.3 people killed per terrorist action. By comparison, in the world during the same period, an attack killed an average of 4.6 people. The fight against foreign interference is a key reason for violence by Islamists. On 19 August 2003, the car bomb attack against the Canal Hotel, UN headquarters in Baghdad, killed 22 people. The year 2004 saw a series of terrorist attacks targeting coalition member countries in Iraq, with 5 attacks against personnel at military bases, checkpoints and patrols of the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I). At the same time, the development of hostage takings/kidnappings became more common to terrorist actions: while we do not record any hostage takings or kidnappings in 2001, 2002 and 2003, there were 27 in 2004, largely aimed at civilians from countries militarily deployed in Iraq (5 Americans, 4 Japanese, 3 South Koreans, 1 Bulgarian, 1 Canadian, and 1 Italian). Among the countries involved in the war, the United States was greatly affected: between 2001 and 2012, in Iraq, 34 attacks targeted Americans, including 15 during the year 2004.

Deadliest terrorist groups in Iraq (2001-2012)

As a % of the number of victims of the attacks





2001-2012

8,265 attacks
38,187 deaths
Average number of
deaths per attack: 4.6

COUNTRIES AFFECTED BY ISLAMIST TERRORISM (2001-2012)

1 AFGHANISTAN

2,536 attacks | 8,054 deaths

2 PAKISTAN

1,009 attacks | 4,997 deaths

3 IRAQ

914 attacks | 8,534 deaths

4 ALGERIA

749 attacks | 2,007 deaths

5 NIGERIA

581 attacks | 2,044 deaths

6 SOMALIA

520 attacks | 1,540 deaths

7 PHILIPPINES

387 attacks | 806 deaths

8 YEMEN

347 attacks | 1,618 deaths

9 INDIA

275 attacks | 1,661 deaths

10 ISRAEL

233 attacks | 551 deaths

11 WEST BANK AND THE GAZA STRIP

161 attacks | 274 deaths

12 THAILAND

111 attacks | 91 deaths

13 KENYA

99 attacks | 142 deaths

14 INDONESIA

37 attacks | 302 deaths

15 BANGLADESH

35 attacks | 82 deaths

16 SYRIA

29 attacks | 356 deaths

17 RUSSIA

26 attacks | 724 deaths

18 LEBANON

26 attacks | 78 deaths

19 SAUDI ARABIA

19 attacks | 119 deaths

20 IRAN

18 attacks | 176 deaths

21 UNITED STATES

16 attacks | 3,016 deaths

22 MALI

16 attacks | 37 deaths

23 MAURITANIA

12 attacks | 43 deaths

24 UNITED KINGDOM


11 attacks | 57 deaths

25 NIGER

10 attacks | 16 deaths

26 EGYPT

9 attacks | 192 deaths



27 MOROCCO
8 attacks | 66 deaths

28 TUNISIA
8 attacks | 32 deaths

29 FRANCE
8 attacks | 8 deaths

30 TURKEY
7 attacks | 97 deaths

31 SPAIN
6 attacks | 191 deaths

32 BAHRAIN
6 attacks | 2 deaths

33 JORDAN
5 attacks | 63 deaths

34 UZBEKISTAN
5 attacks | 10 deaths

35 ETHIOPIA
3 attacks | 100 deaths

36 UGANDA
3 attacks | 75 deaths

37 LIBYA
2 attacks | 4 deaths

38 TAJIKISTAN
2 attacks | 4 deaths

39 CHINA
2 attacks | 3 deaths

40 GERMANY
2 attacks | 2 deaths

41 KAZAKHSTAN
2 attacks | 1 death

42 UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
2 attacks | 0 death

43 BULGARIA
1 attack | 7 deaths

44 QATAR
1 attack | 2 deaths

45 MYANMAR
1 attack | 1 death

46 BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA
1 attack | 1 death

47 MALAYSIA
1 attack | 1 death

48 CANADA
1 attack | 0 death

49 KUWAIT
1 attack | 0 death


50 SWEDEN
1 attack | 0 death

2. Globalisation of Islamist terrorist attacks

Between 2001 and 2012, an increase in Islamist terrorist attacks is observable in several geographical areas in the world. Compared to the previous period (1979- 2000), there was a sharp increase in the number

of terrorist attacks, with 8,265 attacks (compared to a total of 2,194 between 1979 and 2000) and 38,187 deaths (compared to a total of 6,817 between 1979 and 2000). This dramatic increase is partly due to the globalisation of *jihad*, facilitated by the acceleration of the circulation of people and ideas.

Islamist terrorist attacks in the world (2001-2012)



Since 2004, Europe has been confronted with a wave of attacks of a new magnitude. On 11 March, in Madrid, four trains exploded almost simultaneously. Claimed by Al-Qaeda, these attacks killed 191 people. On 7 July 2005, four explosions hit public transportation in London, killing 56 people and wounding 784. Though Al-Qaeda claimed responsibility for these attacks, the terrorists, unlike those of 9/11, were natives of the United Kingdom. Gilles Kepel sees this as a change in the implementation of Islamist terrorist attacks, which now rely on "a human resource specific to the Western country targeted"³.

In addition, many Islamist movements are intensifying their inter-regional collaborations, such as in Asia. The 9/11 attacks on the ground claimed by Al-Qaeda and then the intervention in Afghanistan by American troops helped further the link between Osama bin Laden and various South Asian groups⁴,

examples of which are Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) in Indonesia. The difficulty is to examine, in each context, the way in which people and violent groups combine local elements, regional and global within the referents, the objectives and the operating methods they mobilise and implement. Trends then appear to be oscillating between unrelated ethno-nationalism with global jihad and a transnational religious referent⁵. The situation in Thailand during this period takes part in this dynamic. From 2004 onwards, in the context of a separatist insurgency, the south of the country where a Muslim minority lives is crossed by violent activism. The two main groups Runda Kumpulan Kecil (RKK) and the Patani United Liberation Organisation (PULO), are then organised around a jihadist discourse. For a number of attacks occurring at this time, the Islamist character is sometimes found intertwined with ethno-nationalist claims.


3. Gilles Kepel, *Sortir du chaos. Les crises en Méditerranée et au Moyen-Orient*, Gallimard, 2018, p. 147.

4. See David Martin Jones, Michael Smith et Mark Weeding, "Looking for the Pattern: Al Qaeda in Southeast Asia-The Genealogy of a Terror Network", *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, vol. 26, n° 6, November 2003, p. 443-457.

5. See Gabriel Facal, "Les groupes islamistes radicaux en Asie du Sud-Est-Panoramas institutionnels, réseaux d'affiliation et références", *Note d'actualité* n° 10/16, Observatoire de l'Asie du Sud-Est, cycle 2018-2019, asiacentre.eu, July 2018 [online].

According to our estimate between 2001 and 2012, we identify 111 attacks and 91 deaths in Thailand. According to the possible estimate, we count 146 attacks and 121 deaths over the same period. In the latter we also take into account the actions of terrorists accused of being Muslim separatist extremists.

Number of terrorist attacks by province in Thailand (2001-2012)



The rise of Islamist terrorism can also be explained by the development of Al-Qaeda's ramifications, such as that of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQPA) or Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).

The ramifications of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQPA) and of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) (2001-2012)

Ramifications	Countries	Number of attacks	Number of deaths
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQPA)	Yemen	320	1,533
	Saudi Arabia	7	40
Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)	Algeria	166	585
	Niger	10	16
	Mauritania	9	16
	Mali	8	33

These different branches develop a capacity to hit hard abroad, as shown by the three successive attacks of 9 November 2005 by Al-Qaeda in Jordan, at the Grand Hyatt Hotel in Amman, which caused the deaths of at least 61 people, and the one on 28 November 2002 at the Paradise Hotel in Mombasa, Kenya, killing 16 people.

Relatively spared until then, sub-Saharan Africa became a target of Islamist terrorism in the second half of the 2000s. The creation and expansion of the Al Shabaab group, formerly the armed wing of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), in Somalia in 2006 was central. Pursuing the objective of overthrowing the


Somali government in order to establish a regime founded on shari'a law, Al Shabaab has been cultivating close links with Al-Qaeda, thus forming part of the global jihadist movement⁶. The group's activity goes beyond the borders of Somalia, where the group has committed 459 attacks and killed 1,396 people, to reach Kenya, where it attacked 97 times (126 deaths), and Ethiopia, where it struck twice, including the devastating attack (100 deaths) on 2 November 2007 against Ethiopian soldiers in a hotel in Dolo.

Al-Shabaab's targets in Somalia (2001-2012)

Type of target	Number of attacks	Breakdown by target (in %)
Military	129	28.1
Civilians	121	26.4
Government	79	17.2
Police	16	3.5
Terrorist groups and militias	16	3.5
Diplomacy	14	3.1

Sub-Saharan Africa was also the first to suffer acts of violence by Boko Haram, which have been recorded in Nigeria since 2009. The considerable scale of its attacks between 2010 and 2012 (566 attacks, 1,655 deaths) foreshadowed its power of destruction over the next decade.

Types of weapons used in Islamist terrorist attacks (2001-2012)



*As the available information on recorded attacks may be incomplete, the total number of attacks by weapon type does not equal 100%.

6. See Center for International Security and Cooperation (Cisac), "Al Shabaab", cisac.fsi.stanford.edu [online].

3. Terrorist migration to social media

The Internet obviously plays a key role in the globalisation of Islamist terrorism. It turns out to be a powerful propaganda and recruitment tool⁷. The emergence of social media allows Islamist groups to interact effectively and often anonymously, to share documents and information, but also to establish a community of interconnected individuals. According to Evan Kohlmann, "90% of terrorist activity on

the Internet takes place using social networking tools. These forums serve as a virtual firewall to help safeguard the identities of those who participate, and they offer subscribers a chance to make direct contact with terrorist representatives [...]"⁸. Furthermore, cyber-terrorism is also a modality of attack for Islamist groups which thus multiplies their capacity for action.

The impact of terrorist violence in a global public space within the reach of the individual media

From the mid-1990s onwards, access to visibility took on unprecedented proportions. The digital public space increased the impact of terrorist actions tenfold. The coupling of the Web with continuous news channels amplified the effects of Islamist violence. Al Jazeera, the Qatari channel launched in 1996, broadcasts in some 30 countries and develops information websites in the few languages that can be used to reach most residents of the planet. Social media and other secure messaging applications offer the most modest of these terrorist groups the tools of global action: communication, propaganda, organisation, recruitment... The smartphone extends to the end of the chain, i.e. the individual, the mastery of these powerful tools and access to all networks. Media coverage of the attacks always goes through the traditional media (agencies, television, radio and the press) but it no longer depends on them. In the universal public space, production information is absolutely disseminated. The Web and the smartphone give the human multitude the powers of a news agency with 2.8 billion correspondents and the influence capabilities of numerous media. Islamic terrorism thrives in the age of the individual media. The depth of the network, the strength of the images, and the play of algorithms mean that any attack can become a global event in a matter of minutes.

1. Voir Dominique Reynié, « Le retour des foules », *Commentaire*, n° 182, 2023, pp. 273-284

• Emergence of the World Wide Web (Web).

- 11 September: attacks in New York.
- 7 October: Osama bin Laden publishes a video stating that "America was touched by Allah at its most vulnerable point, destroying, thank God, its most prestigious buildings". Between 2003-2004 and 2006-2011, Bin Laden repeated this type of video recordings, broadcasted on the Al Jazeera channel or Islamist websites.

• Emergence of Snapchat.

- May: creation of a Twitter account by the Taliban (@alemarahweb, "@emirataweb") to send several daily messages, mostly in Pashtun, the language of Afghanistan's largest ethnic group.
- 7 December: the Twitter account of Al Shabaab (a terrorist group based in Somalia) is discovered under the pseudonym @HSMPress. Very quickly, it gathered tens of thousands of followers.
- 25 December: in Nigeria, Boko Haram claims a series of attacks on Christmas Day in a video on YouTube and then on Twitter.

• During the terrorist attacks in Mumbai, India, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) attackers used advanced communication technologies, including handheld GPS' and Google Earth satellite images to plan and execute their attacks.

• Emergence of Myspace.

• Emergence of Skype.

• Emergence of Facebook.

• Emergence of YouTube.

• Emergence of Twitter.

• Emergence of d'Instagram.



7. David Thomson, *Les Français jihadistes*, Paris, Les Arènes, 2014, "young people who discover hadiths on the Internet are completely deaf to all those who, at the mosque, can try to explain that the meaning of prophecies is part of a context: for them, who have come to sacred texts alone or with jihadist propaganda, the historical or figurative interpretation is an 'innovation', that is, the worst thing since it distorts and biases the meaning they think is original".

8. Evan Kohlmann, cited in Gabriel Weimann, "Terrorist Migration to Social Media", *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 16, n° 1, 2015, p. 181.

- 8 March-8 June: 1,348 videos of the Islamic State are uploaded to YouTube and generate 163,391 views; 76% of these videos remained on YouTube for less than two hours but were viewed 14,801 times; 278 accounts uploaded 1,348 of these videos to YouTube; 60% of the accounts remained online after deleting the uploaded videos for content violations.
- May: Twitter announces the removal of 360,000 accounts of Islamic State supporters.
- 11 May: The Islamic State bypasses Instagram's security controls to promote the killings of kafir (unbelievers) with decapitation images.
- 13 August: Indian authorities thwart several attacks in the country by following the discussions of groups of young Indian and Afghan Islamist militants on Telegram.
- November 29: For the first time, the Islamic State claims responsibility for an attack on TamTam: the stabbing attack on London Bridge, carried out by Pakistani terrorist Usman Khan, leaves two people dead and three injured.¹²

- May: The Islamic State launches al-Hayat Media to recruit non-Arabic-speaking and Western jihadists.
- 13 June: A campaign entitled "One Billion Muslims to Support the ISIS" is launched by the Twitter user @a_jzra. The tweets were shared hundreds of times an hour.
- 20 June: The Twitter #AllEyesOnISIS campaign launched by the Islamic State announces an imminent invasion of northern Iraq. This type of communication allows the Islamic State to attract foreign jihadists.
- 19 August: The Islamic State publishes a video of the beheading of journalist James Foley.
- September-December: At least 46,000 Twitter accounts are used by supporters of the Islamic State.
- 2 September: The Islamic State publishes a beheading video of journalist Steven Sotloff, an American-Israeli journalist.
- 13 September: The Islamic State publishes a beheading video of David Cawthorne Haines, a member of a British humanitarian organisation.
- 16 November: The Islamic State publishes a video of the beheading of Peter Kassig, a U.S. Army ranger.

- January: In a video, Amedy Coulibaly claims to have committed the attacks of 8 and 9 January, in Montrouge and at the Hyper Cacher store at the gate of Vincennes, in Paris, on behalf of the Islamic State.
- 14 January: In a video posted online, Nasser Ben Ali Al-Anassi claims responsibility for *Charlie Hebdo's* attack on behalf of Al-Qaeda.
- The Islamic State organisation uses Telegram, with the hashtag #KhilafahNews, to attract new supporters, often blocked on Facebook and Twitter. The Islamic State plans 19 of its 38 attacks in Western Europe from 2014 to 2016 via Telegram.

- May: launch of the free message platform TamTam, which belongs to the Russian Mail.ru group. It enables conversations with over 20,000 participants and calls with 100 participants. TamTam allows the creation of anonymous accounts that are not linked to a telephone number, but to a Google account or Odnoklassniki (a Russian social network).¹⁰

- May: The Institute for Strategic Dialogue identified 20 TikTok accounts that had posted over 100 videos supporting the Islamic State. The videos posted garnered a total of more than 500,000 views over the month.

- February: The Islamic State posts 11 propaganda videos on TikTok, including a video of the execution of two Japanese hostages, journalist Kenji Gotō, and businessman Haruna Yukawa. Other videos show a militant using rocket launchers and rifles, and a suicide car bomb attack in Mosul, Iraq, organized by the Islamic State.¹³

- 14 August: Creation of the Telegram encrypted messaging application.

- Emergence of TikTok⁹.

- April: The Islamic State opens its first telecommunication channels on TamTam under the name *Nashir News Agency* (also used on Telegram channels).



9. See Georgia Wells, "Islamic State Turns to Teen-Friendly TikTok, Adorning Posts With Pink Hearts", *The Wall Street Journal*, 21 October 2019.

10. See Gabriel Weimann and Alexander Pack, "TamTam: The Online Drums of Hate", *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, p.1-16, June 28, 2023 [online].

11. *Ibid*

12. *Ibid*

13. See Ciaran O'Connor, "Hatescape: An In-Depth Analysis of Extremism and Hate Speech on TikTok", *Institute for Strategic Dialogue*, August 24, 2021 [online].

14. See Moustafa Ayad, "CaliphateTok: TikTok continues to host Islamic State propaganda", *Institute for Strategic Dialogue*, June 13, 2023 [online].

III. The new faces of Islamist terrorism (2013-April 2024)

On 17 December 2010, the immolation of the young street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi, in the Sidi Bouzid region of Tunisia, led to the flare-up of the Arab Spring. After some time raising hopes of democratisation, these events led, in the first half of the 2010's, to electoral victories for parties close to the Muslim Brotherhood. While they occasionally failed to retain power, they are "supported by increasingly conservative societies, also as a result of the spread of Salafism imported from Saudi Arabia"¹.

In this new context, jihadism is developing regionally, based in particular on the proclamation by the Islamic State (IS) of the Caliphate in Mosul in 2014. It is during this period that Islamist terrorism is the most deadly. There has been an unprecedented increase of the number of attacks worldwide. The rise of IS and Boko Haram is facilitated by chaotic geopolitical contexts that offer terrorists many opportunities for expansion.

1. The Islamic State and the "management of savagery"

The group Islamic State emerged and then settled during the Iraqi civil war, between 2003 and 2011. The organisation was created in 2006 and, three times, its name change accompanied its expansion outside its Iraqi hub: first as an Islamic State in Iraq (ISI, 2006-2013), then as an Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, 2013-2014) and finally as an Islamic State (IS, from 2014).

Theorised in the 2000s, the strategy of the IS is to promote chaos, the "management of savagery"², and to globalise jihad. Its objective is to cultivate religion in the minds of the masses, to make Islam the only political and social order, and to train young people in order to establish a militarised society. The IS operates in several ways. The terrorist group may incite individuals to act alone. These are the "lone wolves". Popularised in the 1990s, this expression has been used by the IS through different publications.

"Since the emergence and territorialisation of the IS, women's jihadism has taken on a new dimension. Before the existence of the Islamic State (IS), neither Al-Qaeda nor any other "jihadosphere" organisation had called on women to massively join their cause or to contribute morally and physically. The IS offered a new conception of women's jihadism and proposed a manipulation of the feminine dynamics of their engagement."

Translated from Fethi Benslama and Farhad Khosrokhavar,
Le Jihadisme des femmes. Pourquoi ont-elles choisi Daech ?, Seuil, 2017, pp. 9-10.


1. Hakim El Karoui, *La Fabrique de l'islamisme*, Institut Montaigne, September 2018, p. 85. Also see Hakim El Karoui, Benjamin Hodayé, *Les militants du djihad*, Fayard, 2021.

2. Expression taken from "The Management of Savagery: the most critical stage the *ummah* will go through", a text in Arabic published on the Internet in 2004 and written under the name of Abu Bakr Naji, a pseudonym of Mohamed Hassan Khalil al-Hakim, alias Abu Jihad al-Masri, an executive of Al-Qaeda. This text is intended to serve as a spiritual guide for many extremists. It explains the strategy to establish an Islamic caliphate. According to some commentators, the manifesto contains "103 pages of hate speech, against the Jews, against Christians, against the apostate, against democracy and its values. So much so that some have called it the *Mein Kampf* of the little jihadist. The interest of this book is that it puts us, right from the title, in front of the paradox of jihadism, which on the one hand advocates the unleashing of savagery, the installation of the law of the jungle, with the call for the destruction of the old order, and at the same time theorises the management of this savagery and its 'administration'" (Abderrazak Sayadi and Alberto Fabio Ambrosio, "Terrorisme : anatomie du 'Mein Kampf' djihadiste", *contreponts.org*, 27 March 2018 [online]).


A lone wolf becomes radicalised, plans and executes an attack on their own, without being affiliated with a particular terrorist group, even if they can claim the attack on behalf of the IS³. It should be noted that failed attacks are generally not claimed by the Islamic State⁴. The Iraqi-Syrian “parent company” directly claims responsibility for the most deadly attacks⁵. Examples include the attack on the Bardo Museum in Tunisia on March 18, 2015, and the November 13, 2015 attacks in France, for which the IS claimed responsibility the very next day.

As it grows in power, the IS is expanding its battlefield. According to our census, it was from 2013 onwards that the organization multiplied its terrorist acts. For that year, we count almost thirty-one times as many attacks committed by IS compared with the previous year (374 attacks in 2013, compared with 12 in 2012).

Islamist terrorist attacks in the world (2011-April 2024)



Terrorist attacks the Islamic State claimed responsibility for (2006-April 2024)



69,641 deaths from the 15,559 attacks perpetrated by the various branches of the Islamic State organisation (2006-April 2024)

Organisations: Islamic State in Iraq, Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, Islamic State in Bangladesh, Islamic State in Somalia, Islamic State in Egypt, Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, Khorassan Province of Islamic State, Najd Province of the Islamic State in Saudi Arabia, Sinai Province of the Islamic State, Province of al-Tarabulus (Tripoli) of the Islamic State in Libya, Province of al-Fezzan of the Islamic State in Libya, Caucasus Province of the Islamic State, Barqah Province of the Islamic State in Libya, Algeria Province of the Islamic State, Al-Bayda Province of the Islamic State, Aden-Abyan Province of the Islamic State, etc.

3. See Mathieu Guidère, *Atlas du terrorisme islamiste. D'Al-Qaida à Daech*, Autrement, 2017.

4. For example, the attempted attacks in Villejuif on 19 April 2015 and on the Thalys train on 21 August 2015.

5. See Anne-Aël Durand, William Audureau, Maxime Vaudano, Madjid Zerrouky and Gary Dagorn, “Les attaques de l'État islamique ont fait plus de 2 500 morts en deux ans”, *lemonde.fr*, 17 June 2016 [online].

Note that Boko Haram is not included here, although this group pledged allegiance to the IS in March 2015. We have focused the following section on this terrorist group in order to highlight its singularity. Nevertheless, if we add the terrorist acts committed by Boko Haram since 2015 to the number of attacks perpetrated by the IS and its various branches since its creation in 2006, we obtain the figure of 19,640 attacks resulting in the deaths of 89,268 people .

Following the proclamation of the "caliphate" in June 2014, a multitude of Islamist groupuscules joined under the IS banner. This strategy of expansion enables the organization to establish itself across Africa and the Middle East, relying on the foothold of local jihadist groups. In 2016, the IS murdered 13,746 people. This was the deadliest year on record for the entire period 1979-April 2024. The number of IS victims increased ninefold in three years (1,458 deaths in 2013, 13,746 deaths in 2016). The chart on page 36 shows the evolution of the number of attacks committed by the various branches of the Islamic State organization from its inception to April 2024.

The territories most affected are those where IS has historically established itself, namely Iraq and Syria. The wars in these countries have facilitated the Islamic State's development, allowing it to conquer several cities and provinces and establish a totalitarian regime with the goal of re-establishing an "Abbasid caliphate." IS terrorists have been most destructive in Iraq, where they have carried out 7,178 attacks, resulting in 36,029 deaths. This means that of the 43,422 people who have died in Iraq due to Islamist terrorism since 1979, 83% were victims of IS between 2006 and April 2024.

Islamic State's targets in Iraq (2013-April 2024)

Types of targets	Number of attacks	Breakdown by target (in %)
Civilians	2,758	38.4
Military	2,071	28.9
Police	1,046	14.6
Business	341	4.8
Government	226	3.1
Religious institutions	115	1.6

IS in Syria

In Syria, between 2013 and April 2024, Islamic State attacks were very deadly, with 1,962 attacks claiming the lives of 11,775 people; on average, in the country, the IS causes the death of 6 people with each of its attacks. Some neighboring countries have also been subject to IS intrusion through its offshoots, particularly since 2014. Here again, these intrusions are facilitated by destabilizing contexts, which in turn promote the terrorist organization's hold on these territories, which IS has regarded as its "new provinces" since 2013: Mozambique (1,072 attacks, 4,081 deaths), Egypt (889 attacks, 2,493 deaths), Afghanistan (850 attacks, 4,198 deaths) Libya (578 attacks, 1,171 deaths), Pakistan (170 attacks, 807 deaths) as well as Yemen (116 attacks, 1,008 deaths).

On March 23, 2019, thanks to US-backed Arab-Kurdish forces, the EI is defeated. The end of the self-proclaimed caliphate is official with the capture of the last Syrian territory held by the jihadist organization. But deprived of its Iraqi-Syrian stronghold, the EI has not lost all its capacity to cause harm, and is decentralizing its activism towards its subsidiaries. Witness the murderous attacks in Sri Lanka on Easter Sunday on April 21, 2019, and the attacks on three policemen in Saudi Arabia on the same day.

IS in Mozambique

The Islamic State is also responsible for numerous attacks in Mozambique, through the group "Al-Chabab in Mozambique"⁶, affiliated to the Islamic State since 2019⁷. On March 24, 2021, this group succeeded in taking the strategic port city of Palma, in the Cabo Delgado region. Little data exists on this attack, as the Mozambican army regained control of the city a few days later, on April 5, 2021. The ACLED data did not allow us to gather enough elements to illustrate this event. We have therefore relied on the investigation carried out by independent journalist Alexander Perry⁸, winner of the George Polk Award. Between November 2022 and March 2023, a team of investigators visited the six districts of Palma and 15 surrounding villages. They were able to visit 13,686 inhabitants' homes and assess the impact of this event on local populations. Thanks to this fieldwork, they were able to estimate

6. "Al-Chabab" in Mozambique should not be confused or associated with "Al-Shaabab" in Somalia. "Al-Chabab" in Mozambique is a local name meaning "the youth" in Arabic, and is made up mainly of the youth of Cabo Delgado.

7. Conrado Régio. "L'extrémisme islamiste au nord du Mozambique : Terrorisme et insécurité à Cabo Delgado", Institut de Recherche Stratégique de L'École Militaire (IRSEM), study n°94, May 2022.

8. "Palma Massacre - Alex Perry". Alexandre Perry, June 27, 2023 [online].

that 1,193 people had been killed or presumed dead, and 209 people had been kidnapped, establishing a total of 1,402 victims of the takeover of Palma in just a few days. With this data, we can note that this is one of the top three deadliest Islamist attacks since September 11, 2001, along with October 7, 2023.

Mozambique has been plagued by Islamic terrorism for many years, particularly since the rise to power of Al-Chabab, whose official name is Alhu Sunna Wal Jamma (ASWJ), also known as Ansar al-Sunna, and represented by international terrorist Bonomado Machude Omar⁹. On October 5, 2017, he and Ansar al-Sunna led the first insurrection against a police station, killing 18 people¹⁰. This event marked the start of a war between police forces and the Mozambican army against Islamist militants, which is still ongoing. This war has resulted in over a million people being displaced from the region and at least 4,671 deaths¹¹.

In May 2022, the Islamic State proclaimed the "Mozambique Province" (ISIS-M or ISM), without specifying its exact borders. However, ongoing clashes with Mozambican, Rwandan, and SADC¹² armed forces significantly reduced the jihadist presence in Cabo Delgado between 2021 and 2023.

With the insurgent presence having diminished, the SADC armed forces have started withdrawing from the region, a process set to be completed on July 15, 2024. Rwanda, however, plans to maintain its military presence by sending an additional 2,000 soldiers at the same time. Despite being weakened, the Islamic State's presence in Mozambique remains a reality, and the region is still particularly fragile and dangerous. In March 2024, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) reported over 110,000 displaced persons¹³ since December 2023 due to attacks by jihadist groups in the region.

The attacks perpetrated by the Islamic State in Europe (2013-April 2024)

Country	Number of attacks	Number of deaths	Average number of deaths per attack
Russia	40	224	5.5
France	14	149	10.6
Belgium	8	44	5.5
United Kingdom	4	31	7.8
Spain	3	21	7.0
Austria	2	5	2.5
Germany	2	1	0.5
Total	73	475	5.6

IS in France

With the exception of Latin America, many countries across other continents have been targeted by the Islamic State, with attacks on their nationals both at home and abroad. Several European Union countries have been severely impacted, with France being the hardest hit, suffering 14 attacks and 149 deaths caused by the IS¹⁴.

It was on November 13, 2015 that France was struck by a series of terrorist attacks by the IS. In total, 133 people died¹⁵ and 413 were injured. Faced with the scale of the massacre, French President François Hollande, declared on the very evening of the attacks that France had "gone to war" against "the barbarians of Daesh"¹⁶.

These terrorist attacks were claimed by the Islamic State (Daesh). They were carried out simultaneously, in different locations in Paris, by different groups of terrorists in possession of weapons of war (explosives, Kalashnikovs). The first attack took place at the Stade de France (largest stadium in France, located in Saint-Denis, a suburb of Paris) during the friendly match between France and Germany. It was carried out by three men, two brothers of Iraqi nationality and one man of French nationality. Stopped by

9. Antony Blinken, US Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 6 August 2021.
10. ACLED database, this is the attack of October 5, 2017.
11. Solinas, Margaux. "Les femmes du Cabo Delgado, premières victimes des djihadistes au Mozambique". *Le Monde*, March 14, 2024 [online].
12. SADC comprises sixteen countries in Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean: South Africa, Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Seychelles, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Comoros. Five of these are French-speaking.
13. "More than 110,000 people displaced in Mozambique due to rising violence and growing needs". International Organization For Migration, March 8, 2024 [online].
14. See Bernard Rougier, *Les territoires conquis de l'islamisme*, Puf, January 2020; Hugo Micheron, *Le Jihadisme Français: Quartiers, Syrie, Prisons*, Éditions Gallimard, 2020.
15. 130 died on the evening of the attacks, and 3 have since committed suicide. This figure does not include the terrorists who died during the attacks.
16. See Audoin-Rouzeau Stéphane, "L'après-13 Novembre. Birth and death of a "war culture"?", *Vingtième Siècle. Revue d'histoire*, vol. 134, no. 2, 2017, p. 11-19.

security guards, unable to enter the stadium, they detonated their explosive belts on the outskirts of the stadium, killing one and injuring dozens; these were the first suicide attacks in France.

The second attack took place almost simultaneously in the 10th and 11th arrondissement of Paris. The group of assailants consisted of three men, known to have committed terrorist acts in Syria. Armed with Kalashnikovs, the terrorists fired point-blank at customers on the terraces of bars and restaurants. The surprise attack left 39 people dead and 32 injured.

Finally, the third and deadliest of the attacks on the night of November 13, 2015, took place at the Bataclan theatre, during a concert. Assailants armed with explosives and Kalashnikovs entered the concert hall before firing into the crowd, killing 90 people and seriously injuring dozens more. The police arrived ten minutes after the first shots were fired, and were quickly joined by military forces from Operation Sentinelle, who eventually neutralized the Islamist terrorists with the help of elite units specialized in the fight against terrorism.

These survivors who do not survive

Among the victims of this series of attacks on the evening of November 13, 2015, some survivors, who had suffered no physical injuries, were unable to survive the trauma experienced. Three people took their own lives. The first, Guillaume Valette, committed suicide on November 19, 2017, two years after the Bataclan tragedy. He is officially recognized as the 131st victim of the massacre. The second person is France-Élodie Besnier, shaken by the attack on the bar Le Carillon; she took her own life six years later, on November 6, 2021. Finally, Fred Delwilde, a survivor of the Bataclan attacks, took his own life on May 5, 2024, 9 years after the attack. The "Life for Paris" association announced that he had died "overcome by the violence of his traumas, against which he had fought relentlessly, with such courage, talent and generosity since that fateful evening when he said that a part of him had died"¹⁷.

These three people are among the victims included in our study.

A few months later, on July 14, 2016, France was again targeted by Islamist terrorism on its national holiday. Around 10:30 p.m., a 19-ton truck drove into crowds on the Promenade des Anglais in Nice, killing 86¹⁸ people and injuring 458. Besides France,

19 other countries were affected by this attack, which left thousands traumatized. It was the second deadliest terrorist attack in France. Two days after the incident, ISIS claimed responsibility for the massacre.

"I know this letter will hurt you. Yet I'm going to tell you how much I love you. Dad, I asked you for permission to spend a few days at Aunt Safia's. I didn't go there. Forgive me: I lied to you. The day before last night, I arrived in Iraq to join my husband. We met on the Internet. He's a wonderful man. I'm sure you'll like him. He is a regional head of the Islamic State."

Translated from Rachid Benzine, *Lettres à Nour*, Points, 2019.

IS in Russia

Islamist terrorism in Russia is closely tied to the long-standing conflict between the central government and separatist rebels from Muslim territories in the North Caucasus, particularly Chechnya and Dagestan. After centuries of conflict with the central authorities, Chechen separatists declared independence following the collapse of the USSR in 1991. This led to the first Chechen war in 1994, which ended in a defeat for the Russian army, forcing it to withdraw from the region. On October 3, 1998, the Wolves of Islam group assassinated a Russian government official in Ingushetia, accusing him of collaborating with the Federal Security Service (FSB). On February 2, 1999, the Sword of Islam group attacked the Ministry of Energy in Grozny. In response to these and other insurgent actions, Moscow launched the second Chechen war in August 1999. This conflict, which lasted until April 2000, ultimately resulted in the establishment of a government loyal to Moscow, but at the cost of tens of thousands of lives.

The events of 9/11 led Russian authorities to intensify their efforts against Chechen insurgents. This period saw a rise in Islamist radicalization within the separatist struggle, which increasingly sought to establish an Islamic state in Ciscaucasus. On average, from 2001 to 2012, Islamist terrorism claimed around 60 lives per year. During this time, 26 major attacks occurred in the country, with two particularly notable incidents. On October 23, 2002, members of the Chechen jihadist group Special Purpose Islamic Regiment (SPIR) seized 912 hostages at Moscow's Dubrovka Theater. On September 1, 2004, terrorists attacked a school, killing 344 people, many of them

17. Message posted on social network X on May 7, 2024 by the "Life for Paris" association.

18. Not counting the terrorist who died during the attack.

children, and injuring at least 727. This attack was claimed by the *Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs*, which used suicide bombings. Between 2013 and April 2024, the number of terrorist attacks in Russia increased, reaching 58 attacks and 262 deaths, with 20 of these incidents occurring in Dagestan. During this period, the Islamic State also expanded its influence in Russia, notably through the emergence of the Caucasus Province of the Islamic State, which claimed responsibility for 40 attacks. According to Wassim Nasr, a jihadism specialist, there is a "blood debt" between ISIS and Russia that traces back to the conflicts in Syria and Chechnya¹⁸. In fact, in Chechnya, Ingushetia and Dagestan, some separatists have gradually become Islamized to the point of pledging allegiance to IS following numerous confrontations with the Russian army.

According to the American magazine *Foreign Policy*¹⁹, shortly after Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the Islamic State launched a destabilization campaign to stir up hatred of Russia and develop its network of sympathizers.

The two most recent attacks perpetrated by the IS took place in 2024, one in Moscow and the other in Dagestan. On March 22, 2024, four men from Tajikistan entered the *Crocus City Hall* concert hall in the Moscow suburb of Krasnogorsk. They shot the audience at point-blank range with automatic weapons. This extremely violent attack killed at least 144 people and injured 550. A few months later, the Dagestan region was targeted on June 23, killing around 20 people and injuring around 40 (we did not include this attack in our study, as it took place after April 12, 2024, but we felt it was important to mention it here).

The Moscow attack was claimed by a branch of the IS: Islamic State – Khorasan Province (ISKP). Originally based in eastern Afghanistan and born in 2014, Islamic State – Khorasan Province seeks to establish a caliphate that would cover the entire region from Pakistan to Uzbekistan, via Iran. Initially belonging to Pakistani and Afghan Taliban groups, close to al-Qaeda networks²⁰, the future leaders of the ISKP pledged allegiance to the Islamic State in October 2014, and founded the province of Khorassan early the following year. In eastern Afghanistan, the ISKP

carries out extremely violent acts against civilians, particularly those close to the Taliban, and religious minorities.

In May 2022, the ISKP threatened to attack Iran, China, Central Asian countries and Russia, one of the Taliban's main international supporters. In September 2022, they attacked the Russian embassy in Kabul. In January 2024, the ISKP claimed responsibility for the attack in Kerman, Iran, to commemorate the death of Qassem Soleimani, which killed 93 people: the scale of the attack is said to have enabled the terrorist group to raise new funds in the Gulf states²¹. With the Moscow attack in March 2024, the ISKP achieved its goal: to be known and feared by everyone, especially the Western world.

2. The Lake Chad region against Boko Haram's mass terrorism

In the Hausa language, boko haram can be translated as "Western education is a sin". The Boko Haram movement was founded by Nigerian preacher Mohamed Yusuf in 2002 in Maiduguri, capital of Borno State, Nigeria. From an Islamist sect to an armed struggle movement in 2009, the organisation advocates a Jihadist Salafist Islam hostile to any Western influence. Its objective is to create a caliphate, governed by shari'a law, just like the IS, to which it pledged allegiance in March 2015 by being referred to as the Islamic State in West Africa.

18. "The Islamic State and Russia have a blood debt that goes back many years," Wassim Nasr, France info, March 23, 2024.

19. "Why is Russia in the firing line of the Islamic State?", TV5 MONDE, March 24, 2024.

20. Amelot Laurent, "L'extension orientale de l'Organisation de l'État islamique : le cas de l'Asie du Sud", *Outre-Terre*, vol. 44, no. 3, 2015, pp. 100-104.

21. Antonio Giustozzi, "Terrorisme : à un mois des JO, comprendre la menace de l'État islamique au Khorassan", *Le Grand Continent*, June 25, 2024.

Islamist terrorist attacks perpetrated by Boko Haram (2009-April 2024)

Year	Number of attacks	Number of deaths	Average number of deaths per attack
2009	12	382	31.8
2010	17	72	4.2
2011	125	327	2.6
2012	424	1,256	3.0
2013	234	1,729	7.4
2014	495	7,118	14.4
2015	540	6,510	12.1
2016	241	1,470	6.1
2017	333	1,544	4.6
2018	242	1,327	5.5
2019	345	1,929	5.6
2020	196	1,338	6.8
2021	29	125	4.3
2022	94	542	5.8
2023	176	342	1.9
2024	43	70	1.6
Total	3,546	26,081	7.4

The group amplified its terrorist activism from 2009 onwards, leading an insurgency for the creation of a caliphate in Nigeria. In 2013, Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan declared a state of emergency and the Nigerian army launched an offensive throughout the country. Despite this, Boko Haram is taking control of new areas, including Borno State, where 68.9% of its attacks are concentrated (1,955 of the 2,836 Boko Haram attacks in Nigeria). As of 2014, the Islamist group's theatre of operation extends to the countries bordering Lake Chad, in northern Cameroon, in Niger and in Chad.

Islamist terrorist attacks perpetrated by Boko Haram (2009-April 2024)

Country	Number of attacks	Number of deaths	Average number of deaths per attack
Nigeria	2,836	21,085	7.4
Cameroon	450	2,617	5.8
Niger	192	1,540	8.0
Chad	65	838	12.9
Total	3,543	26,080	7.4


Between 2009 and April 2024, Boko Haram was responsible for 3,546 attacks. The human toll (26,081 deaths) is particularly cruel. A significant number of refugees have fled their cities or even their countries. Women and children have even been kidnapped to serve the terrorist organisation, as was the case in April 2014 when 276 high school girls were kidnapped in Chibok, Nigeria.

Boko Haram's targets (2009-April 2024)

Type of target	Number of attacks	Breakdown by target (in %)
Civilians	2,273	64.1
Military	632	17.8
Police	269	7.6
Government	164	4.6
Militias and armed groups	97	2.7
Others	111	3.1

Civilians represented 64.1% of Boko Haram targets between 2009 and April 2024, a significantly high proportion compared to other categories. Among other things, schools where teaching is considered too Westernised are regularly targeted. Military personnel fighting against Boko Haram are also targets, as the villagers who try to defend themselves by creating self-defense militias, and who are most often massacred. With regards to its *modus operandi* it should be noted that Boko Haram uses suicide bombing on a massive scale.

Types of weapons used by Boko Haram (2009-April 2024)




3. The suicide attack, the “martyr” and the terror

It was first during the Iran-Iraq conflict (1980-1988) that we began talking about “suicide attacks”. It was then a question of tactical warfare. On 30 October 1980, Mohammad Hossein Fahmideh, a 13 year-old fanatical Shiite, committed suicide by throwing himself, grenade in hand, under a tank. In total, there were several thousand Iranian children under the age of 16 years old who would rush onto minefields in order to trigger the explosions and allow troops to pass in order to fight on behalf of the Islamic Republic of Khomeyni²². It was then in the context of the Lebanon War that the first “suicide attacks” were perpetrated. In Beirut, on 23 October 1983, two suicide attacks orchestrated by Hezbollah target the American and French contingents of the Multinational Force of security. The first resulted in the death of 241 American soldiers, the second in the death of 58 people, including French paratroopers and the Lebanese family of a building guard. A total of 19 suicide attacks will be committed between 1979 and 2000. They represent 0.9% of the 2,194 acts of Islamist violence in the world.

Suicide attacks require few resources, produce considerable damage and are susceptible to have maximum media impact. Indeed, it profoundly modifies the narrative of the act. It is no longer an attack perpetrated by a terrorist who does not expose themselves or their life to any risk; they are a “martyr” who accept and lead their own “sacrifice” for a cause. Its impact is further increased by the use of the new media order that allows the “martyr” to display their death by filming himself using their smartphone connected to the Web.

Islamist suicide attacks in the world (1979-2000)



Between 2001 and 2012, the use of suicide attacks increased significantly (679), to then represent 8.2% of all Islamic attacks (8,265). The story of the jihadist martyr is carefully crafted and maintained by radical Islamists; their efforts are focused on the religious valorisation of the terrorist gesture. The “terrorist” must consider himself as a *shahid* (martyr). Thus, for these men and women who, in most cases, are under 30 years-old, the act to kill by taking your own life is no longer perceived as a suicide - considered a sin - but it is supposed, on the contrary, to bear witness to great piety to the extent that it harms non-Muslims²³.

If, in Western public opinion, the author of a suicide attack is more often associated with the idea of a fanatical, of a miserable or psychologically unbalanced person, a number of studies seem to contrast this portrait by highlighting the relatively high socio-cultural level of a majority of terrorists killed in suicide attacks²⁴.

This is the case, for example, within Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad Movement, whose terrorists that resort to suicide bombing are generally identified as university graduates and middle-class people²⁵.

22. See Alain Louyot, "Les 'petits martyrs' de la guerre Iran-Irak", *l'express.fr*, 27 September 2001 [online].


23. See Daniel Pipes, "The [Suicide] Jihad Menace", *The Jerusalem Post*, 27 July 2001 [online].

24. See Robert A. Pape, "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism", *The American Political Science Review*, vol. 97, n° 3, August 2003, p. 343-361, or Scott Atran, "The Moral Logic and Growth of Suicide Terrorism", *The Washington Quarterly*, vol. 29, n° 2, Spring 2006, p. 127-147, [online].

25. See Ehud Sprinzak, "Rational Fanatics", *Foreign Policy*, n° 120, September-October 2000, p. 66-73.

Over the period 2013-April 2024²⁶, 2,071 attacks have been identified as suicides, representing 3.7% of the 56,413 Islamist terrorist attacks. Among the attacks carried out by the Islamic State and by Boko Haram, the suicide attack is frequently used. It reflects the culture of death maintained and developed among young jihadists. For Boko Haram, we have identi-


fied 460 suicide attacks from 2013 to April 2024, representing 10.9% of the total number of all attacks attributable to this group, while they represent 10.7% (1,649) of the total attacks by the IS. To carry out its suicide attacks, Boko Haram indoctrinates, manipulates, recruits or coerces women, teenagers and very young children in particular.



Islamist suicide attacks in the world (1979-April 2024)

— Number of deaths
— Number of attacks

Since the data for 1993 has to be consolidated, it is not included in this graph.




From (individual) fear to (collective) terror

“Different types of terrorism use all resources (tactical, media, technological, etc.) to plunge public opinion into stupor. Beyond their differences, what they have in common is they trigger and spread a specific individual and collective emotional state: extreme fear and a sense of generalised vulnerability. In this perspective, terror is a superlative fear [...]. The sources of fear cease to be precisely circumscribed. And fear becomes more enduring and persistent. Moreover, if the fear is individual, the terror is collective: the attack aims to plunge an entire community into a certain state of mind. The increase in the number of victims serves this dynamic and leads to “hyper-terrorism”, according to the formula forged by François Heisbourg. The attacks of 9/11 marked a rupture because they sought to kill a number of people of a different order than the previous attacks. The goal is then terror on a global scale.”

Translated from Cyrille Bret, *Qu'est-ce que le terrorisme ?*, Vrin, 2018, p. 52-53.

26. For the years 2020 and 2021, suicide attacks are not identifiable in the *Armed Conflict and Event Data Project* (ACLED) database.



COUNTRIES AFFECTED BY ISLAMIST TERRORISM (2013-APRIL 2024)


- 1 AFGHANISTAN**
14,520 attacks | 61,955 deaths
- 2 SOMALIA**
10,244 attacks | 18,938 deaths
- 3 IRAQ**
7,274 attacks | 34,749 deaths
- 4 NIGERIA**
3,368 attacks | 23,182 deaths
- 5 SYRIA**
3,320 attacks | 17,236 deaths
- 6 MALI**
2,272 attacks | 6,332 deaths
- 7 PAKISTAN**
1,594 attacks | 5,771 deaths
- 8 ISRAËL**
1,453 attacks | 1,517 deaths
- 9 MOZAMBIQUE**
1,302 attacks | 4,671 deaths
- 10 YEMEN**
1,303 attacks | 3,821 deaths
- 11 CAMEROON**
1,230 attacks | 3,530 deaths
- 12 DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO**
1,151 attacks | 4,773 deaths
- 13 BURKINA FASO**
1,083 attacks | 3,515 deaths
- 14 EGYPTE**
1,047 attacks | 2,792 deaths
- 15 NIGER**
814 attacks | 3,142 deaths
- 16 LIBYA**
740 attacks | 1,522 deaths
- 17 PHILIPPINES**
643 attacks | 669 deaths

- 18 KENYA**
585 attacks | 1,285 deaths
- 19 INDIA**
546 attacks | 720 deaths
- 20 WEST BANK AND THE GAZA STRIP**
540 attacks | 204 deaths
- 21 THAILAND**
219 attacks | 59 deaths
- 22 LEBANON**
146 attacks | 296 deaths
- 23 BANGLADESH**
138 attacks | 143 deaths
- 24 CHAD**
122 attacks | 1,114 deaths
- 25 TURKEY**
84 attacks | 419 deaths

- 26 INDONESIA**
69 attacks | 109 deaths
- 27 TUNISIA**
63 attacks | 241 deaths
- 28 RUSSIA**
58 attacks | 262 deaths
- 29 FRANCE**
53 attacks | 294 deaths
- 30 SAUDI ARABIA**
41 attacks | 115 deaths
- 31 IRAN**
39 attacks | 260 deaths
- 32 BENIN**
39 attacks | 27 deaths
- 33 ALGERIA**
37 attacks | 146 deaths
- 34 UNITED STATES**
35 attacks | 104 deaths
- 35 MALAYSIA**
28 attacks | 12 deaths
- 36 TANZANIA**
20 attacks | 29 deaths
- 37 UGANDA**
19 attacks | 77 deaths
- 38 GERMANY**
19 attacks | 20 deaths
- 39 UNITED KINGDOM**
13 attacks | 51 deaths

2013-12 April 2024

56,413 attacks
204,937 deaths
Average number of deaths per attack: 3.6



40 BELGIUM
12 attacks | 51 deaths

41 SRI LANKA
9 attacks | 266 deaths

42 JORDAN
9 attacks | 37 deaths

43 AUSTRALIA
9 attacks | 11 deaths

44 CANADA
9 attacks | 9 deaths

45 TADJIKISTAN
8 attacks | 84 deaths

46 SOUTH AFRICA
8 attacks | 3 deaths

47 SPAIN
7 attacks | 24 deaths

48 BAHRAIN
7 attacks | 4 deaths

49 CHINA
4 attacks | 104 deaths

50 MYANMAR
4 attacks | 20 deaths

51 ETHIOPIA
4 attacks | 13 deaths

52 AUSTRIA
3 attacks | 7 deaths

53 SWEDEN
3 attacks | 5 deaths

54 DENMARK
3 attacks | 3 deaths

55 SUDAN
3 attacks | 3 deaths

56 MOROCCO
3 attacks | 3 deaths

57 NORWAY
3 attacks | 2 deaths

58 SOUTH SUDAN
2 attacks | 84 deaths

59 IVORY COAST
2 attacks | 37 deaths

60 KUWAIT
2 attacks | 28 deaths

61 DJIBOUTI
2 attentat | 5 deaths

62 NETHERLANDS
2 attacks | 4 deaths

63 ITALY
2 attacks | 1 death

64 KYRGYZSTAN
2 attacks | 1 death

65 TURKMENISTAN
1 attack | 3 deaths

66 FINLAND
1 attack | 2 deaths

67 GEORGIA
1 attack | 1 death

68 AZERBAIJAN
1 attack | 0 death

69 KAZAKHSTAN
1 attack | 0 death

China

For several decades, China has faced the threat of terrorist groups from Muslim communities in neighboring regions, including the Uyghurs, a Turkic-speaking Muslim ethnic group mainly inhabiting Xinjiang province in the northwest of the country. These terrorist groups and their militants advocate for the creation of an Islamic State of East Turkestan and the establishment of Islamist fundamentalism and Uyghur nationalism.

The conflict between the Uyghurs and the Chinese central government escalated in April 1990, when Uyghurs held massive demonstrations in the Akto district to protest the Chinese authorities' refusal to authorize the construction of a mosque. The Chinese government responded with a crackdown, killing over 60 people. In 1996, the Chinese authorities launched the "Strike Hard" campaign, arresting 10,000 people in Xinjiang province. In February 1997, an uprising saw several hundred young Uyghurs protesting in the streets of Guldja for the release of religious dignitaries arrested by the police. The crackdown resulted in 167 deaths.

Since the 9/11 attacks in 2001, the Chinese government has adopted the concept of the "war on terror" to strengthen its anti-terrorist measures and crack down on separatist militants from the Uyghur minority. In response to this repression, many Uyghurs flee to Turkey or join jihadist camps in Indonesia or Pakistan. According to researcher Marc Julienne, "today, Uyghur 'Islamist-nationalist' militants are present and connected to other networks in Central and Southeast Asia, on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, as well as in Turkey and Syria¹."

Between 2001 and May 2021, according to our estimate, the Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP), a Uyghur jihadist group close to Al-Qaeda since the 1990s, committed 6 attacks, resulting in the deaths of 107 people. These terrorist actions included the double attack on July 28, 2014 in Xinjiang province, against Chinese government offices as well as a police station in Elixku and civilians in Huangdi.

The terrorist acts of the TIP are the only ones we have considered to have a clear Islamist motivation in the Chinese context. However, based on what we propose as a "possible" estimate, the total number of attacks carried out by Uyghur separatists is 97, with 513 deaths. The religious dimension of these attacks, over and above political demands, is not clearly predominant.

Since 2021, we have seen a decline in the number of attacks by these terrorist groups. This is the result of a sharp increase in repression by the Chinese authorities. The Uyghur population, identified as a breeding ground for dissent and a threat to China's ethno-nationalist identity, is subject to a policy of systematic persecution².

1. Marc Julienne, "La Chine, nouvel acteur de la lutte contre le terrorisme international", Les Champs de Mars, no. 30, supplement, May 2018, p. 276.

2. Julienne Marc, "Ouïghours du Xinjiang : "Les politiques répressives mises en œuvre par Pékin depuis 2015 sont sans précédent" ", Marianne, July 22, 2020.

4. Afghanistan, the world's hardest-hit country by Islamic terrorism

In June 2017, Donald Trump called for a military withdrawal from Afghanistan, but the US then sent almost 4,000 additional troops to contain the Taliban advance²⁷. By October 2017, Afghan forces still controlled 56% of the country. On February 20, 2020, an agreement was reached between the United States and the Taliban to allow the departure of American forces. On April 14, 2021, Joe Biden officially set the troop withdrawal date for September 11, 2021, to end a "war with no end"²⁸. By early July 2021, the Taliban claimed to hold 85% of the territory²⁹. Kabul fell on August 15, 2021,

bringing the Taliban back to power twenty years after the United States declared war³⁰. As The Economist points out, the results are harsh: "America has been fighting in Afghanistan for twenty years. The United States has spent more than \$2,000 billion on this war. It has lost thousands of soldiers and seen the deaths of tens of thousands of Afghans, both soldiers and civilians³¹".

The updated edition of our database shows that, since 1979, Afghanistan has been the country most affected by Islamist terrorism, both in terms of the number of attacks (17,075) and victims (70,038). The number of deaths more than doubled between 2014 (4,209) and 2020 (10,734), testifying to the escalation of violence, foreshadowing the speed with which the Taliban reclaimed territory until reaching the capital on August 15, 2021. Attacks on civilian and military targets have multiplied. Between 2017

27. See "US sending almost 4,000 extra forces to Afghanistan, Trump official says", theguardian.com, June 16th 2017 [online].

28. See Gilles Paris, « "Il est temps de mettre fin à la plus longue guerre des États-Unis" : Joe Biden défend sa décision de retirer les troupes américaines d'Afghanistan », April 14th 2021, lemonde.fr [online].

29. See « Les talibans affirment contrôler 85 % du territoire », francetvinfo.fr, July 9 2021 [online].

30. See Carter Malkasian, The American War in Afghanistan. A History, Oxford University Press, 2021.


31. See The Economist, "America's war in Afghanistan is ending in crushing defeat", theeconomist.com, July 10 2021 [online].

and April 2024, we counted 5,134 attacks against military targets, 2,551 against police targets, 1,440 against civilians and 536 against government targets. In the first edition of this study, in October 2019, it emerged from our work that the Islamic State was, the deadliest group (52,619 deaths) worldwide, between 1979 and 2019, ahead of the Taliban (39,733) and Boko Haram (22,287). After consolidating the 2018-2019 data and integrating the years 2020, 2021, 2022 and 2023 as well as the first four months of 2024, it appears that the Taliban is the deadliest group with 71,965 deaths worldwide, followed by the Islamic State (69,641) and Boko Haram (26,081).

The Taliban is a fundamentalist Islamist group of Sunni origin. It opposes the coalition government, which includes resistance factions. Mostly involving young Afghans from the poorest areas of the Pashtun peasantry, the Taliban emerged following the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union, but also in reaction to a chaotic internal political situation caused by pro-Soviet governments. They developed a fundamentalism that rejected all Western and Communist influence. In both cases, the Taliban took Kabul in 1996 and 2021, to the detriment of a government that had been disowned by the population. The institutional and political vacuum in Afghanistan was filled by the Taliban through the re-establishment of shari'a law, which won approval from a population desperate for political stability after decades of conflict. The Taliban capitalized on the situation and increased their chances of success by leveraging their strong presence in rural areas to develop poppy cultivation, generating significant income for the country's depleted economy (though this crop has been banned by the Taliban since their return in 2021). Additionally, they received support from various regional state allies, such as Pakistan, which provided arms and logistical assistance, as well as non-state allies like al-Qaeda. The religious indoctrination of Taliban fighters, combined with the presence of limited and demotivated opposition factions, enabled them to control 90% of the territory by 1998 and to regain power in 2021 following the departure of American troops.

However, the Taliban's return to power hasn't eased the insecurity—quite the opposite. Armed groups still commit atrocities across Afghanistan, including the Islamic State in Khorasan, which remains a threat to the Taliban³², despite the fact its offensive capabilities are currently limited (1,000 to 1,300 men). The Taliban are also facing accusations of human rights violations from the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). More than two hundred former civil servants have been killed since August 2021, and human rights violations have been documented throughout the country (Kabul, Kandahar and Balkh provinces)³³. Women's rights are non-existent. For the purposes of our study, we made the methodological choice not to classify as terrorist the violent actions carried out by the Taliban since their return to power in August 2021. Their exactions have therefore not been taken into account as attacks in our study. This methodological choice explains the decrease in the number of terrorist acts and victims in Afghanistan over the period August 2021-April 2024 (352 attacks recorded, with 1,157 victims). We know that the Taliban's actions are still characterized by violence; they continue to terrorize civilian populations.

Islamist terrorist attacks in Afghanistan (2017-April 2024)



32. Amelot Laurent, "L'extension orientale de l'Organisation de l'État islamique : le cas de l'Asie du Sud", *Outre-Terre*, vol. 44, no. 3, 2015.

33. Heard Joel, "Afghanistan: more than 200 former civil servants killed since the Taliban came to power", United Nations Press Release, August 22, 2023.

5. The resurgence of Islamist attacks in West Africa

Since 2021, West Africa has been the scene of several coups d'état. Mali has seen two military coups in the space of nine months: the first, in August 2020, overthrew President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta, while the second, in May 2021, ousted the transitional president Bah N'Daw. Similarly, in Guinea, a military coup in September 2021 ousted President Alpha Condé, who had been in power since 2010. In January 2022, Burkina Faso was also hit by a military coup against President Roch Kaboré.

This context of political instability in West Africa has led to a resurgence of Islamist terrorism, particularly in the Sahel region (Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso and Northern Nigeria). Jihadist groups affiliated to Al Qaeda and the Islamic State have emerged, multiplying terrorist attacks, particularly against civilians. In Nigeria, Boko Haram and the Islamic State in West Africa (ISWAP) pose major security problems, particularly in north-east Nigeria. Mass kidnappings and attacks on civilians and security forces are frequent. Similarly in Mali, the army has suffered numerous setbacks in the Azawad region in the face of Tuareg independence groups and Islamist groups. Finally, the humanitarian crises caused by insecurity in several countries in the region are multiplying. It is estimated that millions of people have been displaced and are living in disastrous conditions. Armed conflict and instability have exacerbated poverty and famine in certain regions, notably in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger.

In this region, the sharp rise in the number of Islamist attacks is linked to the end of foreign military interventions, particularly those led by France through Operation Serval (2013-2014) and then Barkhane (2014-2022), designed to combat jihadist groups in the Sahel region. In Mali, the end of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission (MINUSMA) in 2023 also explains the upsurge in terrorism in the country.

6. Sub-Saharan Africa, a hotbed of Islamist terrorism

Our data shows that between 2019 and April 2024, sub-Saharan Africa remained a major hotbed of Islamist terrorism: 862 attacks and 3,893 deaths in 2019, 2,005 attacks and 5,099 deaths in 2020, 3,675 attacks and 8,750 deaths in 2021, 4,332 attacks and 10,045 deaths in 2022, 4,159 attacks and 9,815 deaths in 2023, and 1,466 attacks and 3,088 deaths between January 1 and April 12, 2024. Between 2021 and April 2024, Boko Haram remained an active and deadly Islamist group in the region, with 342 attacks carried out (4.9% of all Islamist attacks in sub-Saharan Africa), resulting in 1,079 deaths (3.4% of all Islamist terrorism deaths in sub-Saharan Africa). However, it is the Al-Shabaab terrorist group, with 6,294 attacks and 9,327 deaths over the period, that has been the region's deadliest group since 2021. The countries most affected by Islamist terrorism between 2021 and April 2024 are mainly located around the Lake Chad region: Mali (4,983 deaths), Nigeria (4,324 deaths), Democratic Republic of Congo (3,926 deaths), Mozambique (3,782 deaths), Burkina Faso (2,782 deaths), Niger (1,306 deaths), Cameroon (835 deaths) and Chad (212 deaths). To the east, Somalia has suffered a large number of victims of Islamist terrorism (9,152 dead).

Al Shabaab in Somalia

The Al-Shabaab group, meaning "youth movement," is a Sunni military and political organization based in Somalia since the 2000s, also active in Kenya and Ethiopia to a lesser extent. It should not be confused with the group of the same name active in Mozambique since 2017.

Identified as a terrorist organization by the United States in 2008, Al-Shabaab took advantage of the war against Ethiopia and the Somali civil war, which led to the dissolution of state institutions. This enabled it to establish a "proto-state" authority over the southern and central areas of the country, with administrative structures in place since 2010³⁴. The group's actions in the region have been compared to those of the Taliban before they came to power, or to those of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. Al-Shabaab has gradually gained the support of the population by integrating itself into police and judicial institutions³⁵, or by taking over traditional authority structures and

34. Skjelderup M. W, "Jihadi governance and traditional authority structures: al-Shabaab and Clan Elders in Southern Somalia, 2008-2012", *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 31(6), 1174-1195, 2020.

clans, establishing a form of "rebellocracy", with the primary aim of opposing the Somali government³⁶.

Between 2018 and 2020, Al-Shabaab was responsible for 1,574 attacks. This number increased to 6,164 attacks between 2021 and 2024. The intensification of terrorist violence is due, in part, to the rise in the number of Al-Shabaab fighters, who now exceed twelve thousand.³⁷ Many of these fighters are civilians, particularly children, who are often forcibly recruited. Additionally, the Somali federal government's offensive launched in 2022³⁸, following an attack on a Mogadishu hotel in August of the same year, has provoked aftershocks and led the terrorist group to multiply its actions against official structures and the military. Despite support from the African Union and Western partners, the government has so far failed to restore its authority.

Al-Shabaab, backed by Al-Qaeda, is committed to a transnational form of Salafist jihadism, but some of its affiliates are above all driven by nationalist dynamics. A violent opposition has gradually crystallized between the Somali group and the Islamic State, with the former refusing to pledge allegiance to the latter, maintaining its independence and its own interpretation of shari'a law.

Al-Shabaab stands out for its extensive use of social networks, first via discussion forums, then through Facebook and X, which enable them to relay their attacks and messages. The group has recruited a large number of fighters from the Somali diaspora, as well as foreigners specialized in the production of explosives and from groups carrying out suicide attacks: this strong external base reinforces the transnational dimension of Al-Shabaab, which is no longer content with clan and nationalist claims.

7. The October 7, 2023 attacks in Israel: a historic turning point

The attack, named "Operation Al-Aqsa Flood" after the mosque of the same name in Jerusalem, was carried out by the Al-Qassam Brigades, the military wing of the Palestinian Islamist movement Hamas, with support from groups affiliated with the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades. The assault on Israel was launched by land, air, and sea, using modern technological means.

On the morning of October 7, 2023, coinciding with the Jewish holiday of Simchat Torah, thousands of rockets were fired from the Gaza Strip. Initial Israeli army reports indicated that Tel Aviv and the farming community of Lakish were targeted, with later rocket attacks reaching Jerusalem. Al-Qassam Brigades Chief of Staff Mohammed Deif claimed that 5,000 rockets were launched from Gaza that day, while the Israeli army estimated the number at 3,000.

At around 6:30 a.m., terrorists equipped with drones attacked six Israeli military bases and civilian areas, including one town, five kibbutzim, and the "Tribu de Nova" music festival in Ré'im, just a few kilometers from the Gaza Strip. The targets of the attacks were both military and civilian. In the Kibbutz villages of Be'eri and Nirim, civilians were massacred, some taken hostage. At dawn, at the Re'im music festival, the 3,500 festival-goers were targeted by rockets. Some were intercepted by the Israeli missile defense system, the Iron Dome. Later, in a ground assault, 364 festival-goers were killed.

The aim of Hamas, and its companion groups such as the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, is to kidnap as many people as possible, to kill and inflict as much suffering as possible in a short space of time. Some civilians were burned alive in their homes, as seen in the kibbutzim.

The October 7 attack was marked by extreme violence, including numerous murders, acts of torture, rapes, and kidnappings of elderly individuals and infants. The wide range of attacks on various locations and targets, combined with the diverse

35. Marchal R., "A tentative assessment of the Somali Harakat Al-Shabaab", *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 3(3), 381–404, 2009. 36. Ana Arjona, "Rebelocracy : A theory of social order in civil war", *Kellogg Institute for International Studies*, working paper n°422, June 2017, pp 7-12.

Michael Weddegjerde Skjelderup, « Jihadi governance and traditional authority structures : al-Shabaab and Clan Elder in Southern Somalia, 2008-2012 », *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 31, n°6, août 2020, p. 1178.

37. Jonathan Masters, and Mohammed Aly Sergie, "Al Shabaab", Council on Foreign Relations, 6 décembre 2022.

38. Mohamed Dhaysane, « Somalia's President Vows 'Total War' Against al-Shabab », VOA, 24 aout 2022.

methods of violence chosen by Hamas, underscored their intent to instill terror within Israeli society and on the global stage.

Agence France Presse has cross-referenced data from the Israeli Social Security, the army, the police, the Israeli Prime Minister's Office, as well as figures from Internal Security to establish the number of people murdered during and in the aftermath of October 7³⁹. According to this data, the October 7 attack resulted in the deaths of 1,195 people, mostly civilians, and 3,400 injured⁴⁰. Hamas terrorists also took 251 people hostage. Of these, 112 were released in November 2023, following an agreement to exchange hostages for Palestinian prisoners held in Israel. On June 8, four hostages were freed as part of an IDF-led military operation. On 31 August 2024, there were still 98 people being held by Hamas.

Rape: a weapon of Islamic terrorism

In the aftermath of October 7, there were reports of sexual violence committed by Hamas, notably during the "Tribe of Nova" festival⁴¹. On March 4, 2024, the United Nations published a report on the use of sexual violence by Hamas fighters during this pogrom, and in the months that followed⁴². This report highlights the difficulties in gathering evidence of this violence, due to the limited number of forensic examinations carried out because of the exceptional circumstances of the attack (multiple actors, diversification of crime scenes, charred bodies, etc.). However, the UN considers that there are "reasonable grounds to believe" that sexual violence was committed by Hamas fighters. In the

chaos of the music festival massacre, eyewitnesses witnessed scenes of rare violence. Victims were raped, sometimes collectively, sometimes when they were already dead. Women's bodies were found naked, with bullet wounds, some tied to trees. Along Route 232, in the Negev desert, two women were reportedly raped, but this could not be verified by the UN mission team. In the vicinity of this road, several naked bodies, some even bearing traces of genital wounds, were found. In the Re'im and Be'eri kibbutzes, several factors suggest that sexual violence has been committed, including the discovery of naked female bodies. In the Gaza tunnels, according to the testimonies of freed hostages, sexual violence was inflicted on women and children by Hamas fighters.

Sexual violence is used to terrorize populations. Rape, a weapon of war and a war crime, is now used in acts of terrorism⁴³. Through sexual violence, rape, forced pregnancy and prostitution, terrorists subjugate, humiliate and destroy their victims⁴⁴. Inseminating rapes are also a way of colonizing a population's genetics, and were often used as genocidal weapons in the 20th century⁴⁵. These forms of violence are increasingly used by Islamist groups.

39. "October 7 massacres in Israel by Hamas and civilians: an almost definitive toll", *The Times of Israel*, December 15, 2023. Liberation, & Afp. (2024, June 8). Gaza: the Israeli army announces that it has freed four hostages alive, "we won't give up" insists Netanyahu. *Liberation* [online].

40. 815 civilians killed out of the 1,195 victims on October 7, according to figures from the Humans Right Watch report of 2024, previously cited.

41. Christina Lamb, "First Hamas fighters raped her. Then they shot her in the head", *The Times*, December 2, 2023 [online].

42. "UN Women statement on the situation in Israel and Gaza", UN Women press release, December 1, 2023 [online].

43. United Nations Security Council Resolution 2331, "Maintenance of international peace and security". Adopted by the Security Council at its 7847th meeting on December 20, 2016.

Extract from point n°11: "Condemns all acts of trafficking, in particular the sale or trade of persons as practiced by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (EIIL, also known as Daech) against, inter alia, Yazidis and members of other religious or ethnic minorities, also condemns all acts of human trafficking and all violations and abuses committed by Boko Haram, the Chabab, the Lord's Resistance Army and other terrorist or armed groups for the purposes of sexual slavery, sexual exploitation and forced labor" [online].

44. Ibid. Excerpt from point no. 9: "the achievement of the strategic objectives set out above may entail the use of various forms of sexual violence during conflict - rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution and forced pregnancy - which may be associated with human trafficking".

45. Denov, M. (n. d.). Children born of rape: the devastating legacy of sexual violence in post-genocide Rwanda. *The Conversation* [online].

Hamas

Hamas, short for "Islamic Resistance Movement," is a Palestinian Islamist movement founded in 1987 during the first intifada. The group was established by members of the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza, where its activities are primarily centered. The movement emerged in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Lebanese civil war. Classified as a "terrorist organization" by a majority of Western states, including the United States, Canada, Argentina, the United Kingdom, the countries of the European Union and Australia⁴⁶, Hamas enjoys the support of Syria, Algeria, Yemen, Malaysia and Afghanistan⁴⁷. China, Russia and Brazil do not consider it a terrorist organization⁴⁸.

Published in 1988, the Hamas Charter calls for Jihad against the Jews and the creation of an "Islamic state in Palestine", as well as the total annihilation of the state of Israel⁴⁹. In 2017, the charter was amended, dropping all references to the Muslim Brotherhood and rejecting the Oslo Accords, the 1917 Balfour Declaration and the 1947 Palestine Partition Plan. While the 1988 version was openly anti-Semitic⁵⁰, the 2017 charter refuses to equate anti-Zionism with anti-Semitism, as article 16 indicates. The new charter does, however, retain the justification of "armed resistance, which is considered the strategic choice for the protection of the principles and rights of the Palestinian people" (article 25).

Hamas has two branches: the political branch is made up of two bodies, the Shura Council and the Political Bureau⁵¹. The military branch is made up of the Ezzedine Al-Qassam Brigades. Since 1994, these brigades have carried out an increasing number of attacks in Israel, in particular to sabotage the 1993 Oslo Accords, part of a peace process in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict⁵². In 2006, Hamas won the Palestinian legislative elections for the first time, to the detriment of Fatah. Since then, it has administered the territory of Gaza⁵³.

Impact on the region

The attacks of October 7, 2023, prompted the Israeli government to launch a military campaign in the Gaza Strip, primarily aimed at recovering the hostages. In response, Hamas's supporters quickly mobilized to attack Israel and its interests. First, rockets were launched daily by Hezbollah from the northern border between Lebanon and Israel, then, attacks on commercial vessels in the Red Sea by the Houthis, which disrupted international trade. In response, the European Union and the United States initiated operations to secure the Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz⁵⁴.

The Houthis, or Ansarrullah movement, were founded on ideological pillars such as the fight against Israel and American imperialism. Financed by Iran, which includes them in its "Axis of Resistance"⁵⁵, the Houthis took part in the war in Gaza, considerably affecting maritime traffic in the Red Sea, through which over 12% of world trade passes.

46. BBC, "Hamas to be declared a terrorist group by UK" [online].

Government of Canada, press release, June 25, 2024: "Canada imposes additional sanctions in response to Hamas terrorist attacks on Israel" [online].

47. Eugénie Boilait, "Israël : qui sont les pays qui soutiennent le Hamas ou adoptent une réaction en demi-teinte ?", *Le Figaro*, October 11, 2023 [online].

48. Bruno Meyerfeld, (2023, October 27). "Guerre Israël-Hamas : les tentatives infructueuses du Brésil au Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU," *Le Monde*, October 27, 2023 [online].

See also: Benoît Vitkine, "De Russie, le Hamas exclut toute libération des otages sans cessez-le-feu", *Le Monde*, November 30, 2023 [online].

49. Georges Bensoussan, Les pogroms en Palestine avant la création de l'État d'Israël (1830-1948), Fondation pour l'innovation politique, April 2024 [online].

See also: Pierre-Alain Clément, "Note de recherche sur le Hamas", Université de Montréal, 2009.

50. Benny Morris (trans. from English), "Victimes: histoire revisitée du conflit arabo-sioniste", Bruxelles/Paris/Cachan, Éditions Complexes, n°852, 2003.

51. Laetitia Limmois, Mélody Da Fonseca, "Guerre Israël-Hamas : qu'est-ce que le Hamas ?", *Comprendre en trois minutes*, *Le Monde*, October 13, 2023 [online].

52. Fabien Jannic-Cherbonnel, "Israël-Palestine : qu'est-ce que le Hamas, l'organisation islamiste qui contrôle Gaza ?", *Franceinfo*, September 30, 2021 [online].

53. "40 cartes pour comprendre le conflit Israël Palestine", *Le Monde* (Hors-série) [online].

54. On February 19, 2024, the European Union launched the "Aspides" mission to monitor and protect maritime traffic in the Red Sea.

55. "Who are Yemen's Houthis?", Wilson Center, July 7, 2022 [online].

IV. The territories of Islamist terrorism (1979-April 2024)

The globalisation of Islamist terrorism can refer to the global visibility that digital technology provides to their attacks, but it can also designate a geographical reality: more or less, all the regions of the world have been hit. Of course, the damage caused vary considerably depending on the parts of the world. On the number of attacks since 1979, almost all of them (96.7%, or 64,691 attacks) took place in the countries of the Middle East and North Africa, South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa.

With regard to the 249,941 deaths, a considerable proportion (96.8% or 242,035 deaths) was also recorded in these three regions. Undeniably, the Western world is less affected. However, Europe and the United States have faced an increasing and changing threat, with particularly murderous attacks, such as in the United States in 2001, in Spain in 2004, in the United Kingdom in 2005, in France in 2015 and 2016. A multifold of tragedies that remain present in our collective memories.

WORLD


NUMBER OF ATTACKS

66,872 [retained estimate]
78,705 [possible estimate]

NUMBER OF DEATHS


249,941 [retained estimate]
271,892 [possible estimate]

The 'possible estimate' should be between 300,000 and 400,000 dead, taking into account the victims of Islamist terrorism Islamist terrorism in Algeria, according to the best known best known sources and the most reliable studies.



DEADLIEST TERRORIST GROUPS IN THE WORLD


As a % of the number of victims of attacks worldwide between 1979 and April 2024



Taliban	: 71,965 deaths
Islamic State	: 69,641 deaths
Boko Haram	: 26,081 deaths
Al-Shabaab	: 21,784 deaths
Al-Qaeda	: 14,856 deaths
Allied Democratic Forces	: 4,767 deaths
Front Al-Nosrah	: 2,978 deaths
Hamas	: 1,820 deaths
Hezbollah	: 1,367 deaths
Others	: 34,682 deaths

Main targets *	Number of attacks
Military	22,309
Civilians	18,147
Police	10,049
Government	3,457
Terrorist groups and militias	2,929
Unknown	2,370
Business	1,856
Diplomacy	1,722
Religious institutions	989
Educational institutions	774
Transportation	644
Journalists and Media	324

TYPE OF ATTACKS *



Some attacks are carried out using multiple types of weapons at once, including explosives and firearms. In such cases, we have made the methodological choice not to count them twice and to only categorize them under the category "Explosions."

Ex : «On 6 January 2023, Al Shabaab launched an attack against government security forces (SNA) base and took control over Hilowle Gaab village (Adan Yabaal, Middle Shabelle). The attack was initiated with IEDs, hand grenades, RPGs and followed by heavy exchanged of gunfire from both ends. Al Shabaab claimed killing 31 soldiers, injured several others and sized five vehicles».


*Data from Mozambique were not included because the databases used for this country do not allow us to know either the targets or the types of attacks.

"The war on terror has been going on for over seven thousand days. The technological and military superiority of the West against the jihadists is even more obvious than in 1991 against the Iraqi army. Yet the jihadists did not remain spectators to their defeat. They ingeniously practised the fencing of strategy and learned to dodge, tire, feign and break as much as to attack and threaten. They have not, however, managed to repeat an attack as spectacular as that of 9/11, nor to maintain for more than a few years a territorial base comparable to that which they enjoyed in Afghanistan before 2001."


Marc Hecker, Élie Tenenbaum, *La Guerre de vingt ans. Djihadisme et contre-terrorisme au XXI^e siècle*, Robert Laffont, April 2021, Introduction.

MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

NUMBER OF ATTACKS



NUMBER OF DEATHS





The “possible estimate” should be between 120,000 and 270,000 deaths, by taking into account the victims of Islamist terrorism in Algeria, according to the best known sources and the most reliable studies.

ISLAMIST TERRORISM IN THE REGION COMPARED TO THE WORLD



AVERAGE NUMBER OF DEATHS PER ATTACK



DEADLIEST TERRORIST GROUPS



- Islamic State:** responsible for **64.7%** of deaths caused by Islamist terrorist attacks in the region (10,964 attacks, 53,420 deaths)
- Al-Qaeda:** responsible for **12.8%** of deaths caused by Islamist terrorist attacks in the region (2,198 attacks, 10,562 deaths)
- Al-Nusra Front:** responsible for **3.6%** of deaths caused by Islamist terrorist attacks in the region (277 attacks, 2,978 deaths)
- Hamas:** responsible for **2%** of deaths caused by Islamist terrorist attacks in the region (881 attacks, 1,671 deaths)
- Others:** responsible for **16.9%** of deaths caused by Islamist terrorist attacks in the region (5,977 attacks, 13,936 deaths)




Ongoing conflicts


- Yemeni civil war since July 2014
- Second Libyan civil war since May 2014
- Sinai insurgency in Egypt since February 2011
- Syrian civil war since March 2011
- Sahel War since January 2003
- Israeli-Palestinian conflict since 1948

73.3%


attacks by Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State have occurred in the Middle East and North Africa.




Number of attacks (1979-April 2024)



MAIN TARGETS



TYPE OF ATTACKS*



*Totals may not equal 100%, due to rounding to the first decimal place.

SOUTH ASIA

NUMBER OF ATTACKS

20,843 [retained estimate]
22,145 [possible estimate]


NUMBER OF DEATHS

84,211 [retained estimate]
86,868 [possible estimate]

ISLAMIST TERRORISM IN THE REGION COMPARED TO THE WORLD




AVERAGE NUMBER OF DEATHS PER ATTACK




Number of deaths
Number of attacks

Since the data for 1993 has to be consolidated, it is not included in this graph.



DEADLIEST TERRORIST GROUPS



- Taliban:** responsible for **77.1%** of all deaths caused by the Islamist terrorist attacks in the region (16,030 attacks, 64,948 deaths)
- Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP):** responsible for **8.3%** of all deaths caused by Islamist terrorist attacks in the region (1,871 attacks, 7,009 deaths)
- Islamic State:** responsible for **6.4%** of all deaths caused by Islamist terrorist attacks in the region (1,092 attacks, 5,352 deaths)
- Others:** responsible for **8.2%** of deaths caused by Islamist terrorist attacks in the region (1,850 attacks, 6,902 deaths)



Ongoing conflicts


- Armed conflict in northwest Pakistan since March 2004
- Insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir since July 1989

81.9%


of attacks in the region are concentrated in Afghanistan




Number of attacks (1979-April 2024)



MAIN TARGETS



TYPE OF ATTACKS



SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA


NUMBER OF ATTACKS

23,551 [retained estimate]
31,090 [possible estimate]



NUMBER OF DEATHS

75,257 [retained estimate]
87,808 [possible estimate]

ISLAMIST TERRORISM IN THE REGION COMPARED TO THE WORLD



AVERAGE NUMBER OF DEATHS PER ATTACK



DEADLIEST TERRORIST GROUPS



- Boko Haram:** responsible for **34.7%** of all deaths caused by Islamist terrorist attacks in the region (3,546 attacks, 26,081 deaths)
- Al-Shabaab:** responsible for **29.1%** of all deaths caused by Islamist terrorist attacks in the region (11,361 attacks, 21,953 deaths)
- Islamic State:** responsible for **13.6%** of all deaths caused by Islamist terrorist attacks in the region (3,384 attacks, 10,203 deaths)
- Others:** responsible for **22.6%** of deaths caused by Islamist terrorist attacks in the region (5,260 attacks, 17,020 deaths)




Ongoing conflicts


- Ansar al-Sunna insurgency in Mozambique since 2017
- Mali War since January 2012
- Boko Haram insurgency since July 2009
- Al-Shabaab insurgency in Somalia since 2006
- Crisis in the Niger Delta since 2004
- Sahel War since January 2003

7.4


people are killed on average per attack committed by Boko Haram in the region.




Number of attacks (1979-April 2024)



MAIN TARGETS



TYPE OF ATTACKS*



*Totals may not equal 100%, due to rounding to the first decimal place.

* Data from Mozambique have not been included, as the databases used for this country do not allow us to identify targets or the type of attack.

EUROPE AND RUSSIA

NUMBER OF ATTACKS

295 [retained estimate]
360 [possible estimate]


NUMBER OF DEATHS

1,790 [retained estimate]
1,851 [possible estimate]


ISLAMIST TERRORISM IN THE REGION COMPARED TO THE WORLD



AVERAGE NUMBER OF DEATHS PER ATTACK



Number of deaths
Number of attacks



DEADLIEST TERRORIST GROUPS*



- Al-Qaeda:** responsible for **20.8%** of all deaths caused by Islamist terrorist attacks in the region (25 attacks, 373 deaths)
- Islamic State:** responsible for **26.5%** of all deaths caused by Islamist terrorist attacks in the region (74 attacks, 475 deaths)
- Hezbollah:** responsible for **2.7%** of all deaths caused by Islamist terrorist attacks in the region (18 attacks, 48 deaths)
- Others:** responsible for **49.9%** of deaths caused by Islamist terrorist attacks in the region (178 attacks, 894 deaths)

*Totals may not equal 100%, due to rounding to the first decimal place.




Ongoing conflicts


- Ukraine war since February 2022
- Guerilla in Ciscaucasia since April 2009

55.2%

of those who died in Islamist terrorist attacks in Europe were killed in Russia.



Number of attacks (1979-April 2024)



CIBLES PRINCIPALES



44.0% Civilians
130 attacks



24.7% Police
73 attacks




11.2% Government
33 attacks



10.8% Business
32 attacks

TYPE OF ATTACKS





EUROPEAN UNION*

NUMBER OF ATTACKS

174 [retained estimate]
204 [possible estimate]


NUMBER OF DEATHS

687 [retained estimate]
696 [possible estimate]


ISLAMIST TERRORISM IN THE REGION COMPARED TO THE WORLD



AVERAGE NUMBER OF DEATHS PER ATTACK



— Number of deaths
— Number of attacks



DEADLIEST TERRORIST GROUPS*



- Islamic State :** responsible for **32.0%** of deaths caused by Islamist terrorist attacks in the EU (29 attacks, 220 deaths)
- Al-Qaeda:** responsible for **29.8%** of deaths caused by Islamist terrorist attacks in the EU (11 attacks, 205 deaths)
- Hezbollah:** responsible for **7.0%** of deaths caused by Islamist terrorist attacks in the EU (18 attacks, 48 deaths)
- Others:** responsible for **31.1%** of deaths caused by Islamist terrorist attacks in the EU (116 attacks, 214 deaths)

*Totals may not equal 100%, due to rounding to the first decimal place.

* In the first edition of this study, published in 2019, Islamist terrorist attacks in the United Kingdom were included in the European Union record. This is no longer the case in this second edition, following the effective exit of the United Kingdom from the European Union on 31 January 2020.

48.3%


of the attacks claimed by the Islamic State in the European Union took place in France.

7.6

deaths on average per attack perpetrated by the Islamic State in the European Union.

64.4%

of Islamist terrorist attacks in the European Union took place between 2012 and April 2024.




Number of attacks (1979-April 2024)




The United Kingdom has been removed from the map and calculations for the EU due to the effectiveness of the Brexit on 31 January 2020.

MAIN TARGETS



TYPE OF ATTACKS






FRANCE

NUMBER OF ATTACKS

85 [retained estimate]
97 [possible estimate]

NUMBER OF DEATHS

334 [retained estimate]
336 [possible estimate]




CIBLES PRINCIPALES

- 61.2% Civilians**
52 attacks
- 17.6% Police**
15 attacks
- 11.8% Military**
10 attacks
- 7.0% Government**
6 attacks

TYPE OF ATTACKS

- Armed assaults (42)
- Explosions (28)
- Hostage takings/ Kidnappings (8)
- Others (7)



MOST AFFECTED PROVINCES

Province	Number of attacks
Île-de-France	57
Occitania	8
Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur	5
Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes	3


41.6% of those who died in Islamist terrorist attacks in France were killed during the attacks of 13 November 2015.

68.2% of Islamist terrorist attacks in France took place between 2012 and April 2024.

49.1% of those who died in Islamist terrorist attacks in Europe were killed in France.



DEADLIEST TERRORIST GROUP

Islamic State
Responsible for **44.6%** of deaths caused by Islamist terrorist attacks in France



AVERAGE NUMBER OF DEATHS PER ATTACK



1979-2000**24 attacks****32 deaths**Average number of deaths per attack: **1.3****2001-10 March 2012****3 attacks****0 deaths**Average number of deaths per attack: **0****11 March 2012-12 April 2024****58 attacks****302 deaths**Average number of deaths per attack: **5.2**

V. The most affected countries (1979-April 2024)

Over the period studied, 85 countries were affected by at least one Islamist terrorist attack. Among these countries, 18 are European countries (19 including Russia), 14 of which are members of the European Union. Of the 85 countries, 33 are democracies¹. It is also observed that countries most affected by Islamist terrorist attacks in the last forty years are those who have experienced periods of war: Afghanistan, Somalia, Iraq... Most of the 85 countries affected by Islamist violence are developing countries.

Finally, it should be noted that the vast majority (86.3%) of Islamist terrorist attacks have been committed in Muslim countries. As a result, most of the deaths caused by Islamist terrorist attacks (88.9%) are also recorded in Muslim countries. These figures underestimate the reality since they do not take into account the attacks Islamists perpetrated in countries with a majority of non-Muslim where Muslim populations are concentrated in certain provinces. Most of the lives lost are therefore Muslim lives².

The 85 countries affected by Islamist terrorism in the world (1979-April 2024)

Country	Number of attacks	Number of deaths	Average number of deaths per attack
Afghanistan	17,075	70,038	4.1
Somalia	10,768	20,483	1.9
Iraq	8,209	43,422	5.3
Nigeria	3,950	25,226	6.4
Syria	3,421	18,014	5.3
Pakistan	2,635	10,928	4.1
Mali	2,289	6,383	2.8
Israel	1,748	2,244	1.3
Yemen	1,657	5,466	3.3
Algeria	1,387	4,794	3.5
Egypt	1,367	3,535	2.6
Mozambique	1,302	4,671	3.6
Cameroon	1,230	3,530	2.9
Philippines	1,225	1,991	1.6
DRC	1,151	4,773	4.1
Burkina Faso	1,083	3,515	3.2
India	925	2,720	2.9
Niger	829	3,336	4.0
West Bank and Gaza Strip	788	577	0.7
Libya	743	1,528	2.1
Kenya	688	1,651	2.4
Lebanon	520	1,111	2.1
Thailand	357	174	0.5
Bangladesh	198	258	1.3
Indonesia	150	437	2.9
Iran	123	460	3.7
Chad	122	1,114	9.1
Turquie	117	585	5.0
Russia	86	988	11.5
France	85	334	3.9
Tunisia	76	280	3.7
Saudi Arabia	66	324	4.9
United States	60	3,121	52.0
Benin	39	27	0.7
Malaysia	31	13	0.4
United Kingdom	28	111	4.0
Germany	24	22	0.9
Uganda	22	152	6.9
Tanzania	21	40	1.9
Jordan	20	100	5.0
Kuwait	19	44	2.3

Country	Number of attacks	Number of deaths	Average number of deaths per attack
Spain	18	235	13.1
Morocco	17	74	4.4
Bahrain	15	6	0.4
Belgium	14	52	3.7
Mauritania	14	45	3.2
Togo	14	37	2.6
Tajikistan	13	91	7.0
Ethiopia	10	120	12.0
Canada	10	9	0.9
Sri Lanka	9	266	29.6
Australia	9	11	1.2
South Africa	9	4	0.4
Cyprus	9	1	0.1
China	6	107	17.8
Myanmar	6	29	4.8
Sudan	5	25	5.0
Uzbekistan	5	10	2.0
Denmark	5	4	0.8
Austria	4	7	1.8
Sweden	4	5	1.3
Italy	4	2	0.5
Kyrgyzstan	4	2	0.5
Norway	4	2	0.5
Argentina	3	115	38.3
Kazakhstan	3	1	0.3
South Sudan	2	84	42.0
Ivory Coast	2	37	18.5
Greece	2	11	5.5
Netherlands	2	4	2.0
Switzerland	2	1	0.5
United Arab Emirates	2	0	0
Bulgaria	1	7	7.0
Djibouti	1	5	5.0
Turkmenistan	1	3	3.0
Finland	1	2	2.0
Qatar	1	2	2.0
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1	1	1.0
Croatia	1	1	1.0
Georgia	1	1	1.0
Nepal	1	1	1.0
New Zealand	1	1	1.0
Azerbaijan	1	0	0
Ghana	1	0	0

1. See "Democracy Index 2019", *The Economist Intelligence Unit*, 2020 [online].

2. See "Muslim Population by Country", *Pew Research Center*, 27 January 2011 [online].



AFGHANISTAN

NUMBER OF ATTACKS


17,075 [retained estimate]

17,585 [possible estimate]

NUMBER OF DEATHS

70,038 [retained estimate]

73,321 [possible estimate]



MAIN TARGETS



37.4% Military

6,393 attacks



28.0% Police

4,796 attacks



20.5% Civilians

3,510 attacks



8.9% Government

1,517 attacks

TYPE OF ATTACKS



7,807 Armed assaults (45.7 %)



5,150 Explosions (30.2 %)



1,182 Hostage takings/ Kidnappings (6.9 %)



2,936 Others (17.2 %)

MOST AFFECTED PROVINCES

Province	Number of attacks
Helmand	1,280
Kandahar	1,189
Ghazni	1,088
Nangarhar	1,141
Kunduz	931

92.2% of those who died in Islamist terrorist attacks in Afghanistan were killed between 2012 and 2024.

81.9% of Islamist terrorist attacks in South Asia occurred in Afghanistan.

28.0% of those who died in Islamist terrorist attacks in the world were killed in Afghanistan.

DEADLIEST TERRORIST GROUP

Taliban

Responsible for **92.7%** of deaths caused by Islamist terrorist attacks in Afghanistan



AVERAGE NUMBER OF DEATHS PER ATTACK






SOMALIA

NUMBER OF ATTACKS

10,768 [retained estimate]
11,178 [possible estimate]

NUMBER OF DEATHS

20,483 [retained estimate]
20,990 [possible estimate]



MAIN TARGETS

- 55.4% Military**
5,967 attacks
- 17.5% Civilians**
1,880 attacks
- 7.4% Police**
802 attacks
- 6.5% Government**
700 attacks

TYPE OF ATTACKS

- 6,296 Armed assaults (58.5%)**
- 3,061 Explosions (28.4%)**
- 436 Hostage takings/ Kidnappings (4.0%)**
- 975 Others (9.1%)**

MOST AFFECTED PROVINCES

Province	Number of attacks
Banaadir	2,844
Lower Shabelle (Shabeellaha Hoose)	2,898
Lower Juba (Jubbada Hoose)	1,258
Bay	1,003
Hiiraan	658

23.6% of Islamist terrorist attacks in Somalia occurred in Mogadishu, the country's capital (2,542).

2023 is the year in which Islamist terrorism was the deadliest in Somalia (1,706 attacks, 3,652 deaths).

27.2% of those who died in Islamist terrorist attacks in sub-Saharan Africa were killed in Somalia.

DEADLIEST TERRORIST GROUP

Al-Shabaab
Responsible for **98.5%** of deaths caused by Islamist terrorist attacks in Somalia



AVERAGE NUMBER OF DEATHS PER ATTACK





IRAQ

NUMBER OF ATTACKS


8,209 [retained estimate]

8,350 [possible estimate]

NUMBER OF DEATHS

43,422 [retained estimate]

43,841 [possible estimate]



CIBLES PRINCIPALES



46.8% Civilians
3,841 attacks



27% Military
2,216 attacks



14.6% Police
1,196 attacks



4.3% Government
352 attacks

TYPES D'ATTAQUES



4,903 Explosions (59.7%)



1,554 Armed assaults (18.9%)



664 Hostage takings/ Kidnappings (8.1%)



1,088 Others (13.3%)

MOST AFFECTED PROVINCES

Province	Number of attacks
Saladin	1,294
Nineveh	1,331
Al Anbar	1,326
Bagdad	1,166
Diyala	1,258

Baghdad is the most affected city in the world by Islamist terrorist attacks, with 1,112 attacks and 7,263 deaths.


Iraq's portion of the total number of deaths from Islamist terrorism declined from **30.3%** in the 2015-2017 period to **5.5%** for the 2018-2019 period and **1.9%** for the 2020-2024 period.

52.6% of those who died in Islamist terrorist attacks in the Middle East and North Africa were killed in Iraq.

DEADLIEST TERRORIST GROUP

Islamic State

Responsible for **83.0%** of deaths caused by Islamist terrorist attacks in Iraq



AVERAGE NUMBER OF DEATHS PER ATTACK






NIGERIA

NUMBER OF ATTACKS

3,950 [retained estimate]
3,882 [possible estimate]

NUMBER OF DEATHS

25,226 [retained estimate]
25,590 [possible estimate]



MAIN TARGETS

- 53.5% Civilians**
2,115 attacks
- 28.0% Military**
1,107 attacks
- 7.1% Police**
282 attacks
- 4.3% Religious institutions**
170 attacks

TYPE OF ATTACKS

- 1,932 Armed assaults (48.9%)
- 1,114 Explosions (28.2%)
- 337 Hostage takings/ Kidnappings (8.5%)
- 567 Others (14.4%)

PROVINCES LES PLUS TOUCHÉES

Province	Number of attacks
Borno	2,911
Yobe	366
Adamawa	230
Kano	109
Kaduna	68

73.7% of Islamist terrorist attacks in Nigeria are concentrated in Borno State (2,911 attacks).

7.9 people on average die in a terrorist attack committed by Boko Haram in Nigeria.

33.5% of those who died in Islamist terrorist attacks in sub-Saharan Africa were killed in Nigeria.

DEADLIEST TERRORIST GROUP

Boko Haram
Responsible for **83.6%** of deaths caused by Islamist terrorist attacks in Nigeria



AVERAGE NUMBER OF DEATHS PER ATTACK

3.7	3.2	6.4
World	Sub-Saharan Africa	Nigeria



SYRIA

NUMBER OF ATTACKS


3,421 [retained estimate]

4,163 [possible estimate]

NUMBER OF DEATHS

18,014 [retained estimate]

18,913 [possible estimate]



MAIN TARGETS



38.5% Military
1,316 attacks



34.3% Civilians
1,174 attacks



19.7% Terrorist groups and militias
673 attacks



1.8% Government
60 attacks

TYPE OF ATTACKS



1,442 Explosions (42.2%)



1,195 Armed assaults (34.9%)



389 Hostage takings/ Kidnappings (11.4%)



395 Others (11.5%)

MOST AFFECTED PROVINCES

Province	Number of attacks
Deir ez-Zor	797
Aleppo	636
Idlib	517
Homs	358
Al-Hasakeh	244

7.2% of Islamist terrorist attacks in Syria are committed by the Al-Nusra Front (247 attacks, 2,926 deaths).


16.9% of Islamist terrorist attacks in the Middle East and North Africa occurred in Syria.

39.6% of all hostage takings and kidnappings in Syria were committed by the Islamic State.

DEADLIEST TERRORIST GROUP

Islamic State

Responsible for **65.4%** of deaths caused by Islamist terrorist attacks in Syria



AVERAGE NUMBER OF DEATHS PER ATTACK






PAKISTAN

NUMBER OF ATTACKS

2,635 [retained estimate]
3,330 [possible estimate]

NUMBER OF DEATHS

10,928 [retained estimate]
12,220 [possible estimate]



MAIN TARGETS

	39.4% Civilians 1,039 attacks
	25.8% Police 681 attacks
	21.4% Military 563 attacks
	6.6% Government 174 attacks

TYPE OF ATTACKS

	1,248 Armed assaults (47.4%)
	1,044 Explosions (39.6%)
	218 Hostage takings/ Kidnappings (8.3%)
	125 Others (4.7%)

MOST AFFECTED PROVINCES


Province	Number of attacks
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	984
Baloutchistan	308
Sindh	274
Pendjab	172
Islamabad Capital Territory	325

8.6% of Islamist terrorist attacks in Pakistan were suicide attacks between 1979 and 2024.

13.0% of those who died in Islamist terrorist attacks in South Asia were killed in Pakistan.

DEADLIEST TERRORIST GROUP

Tehrik-i-Taliban
Responsible for **58.4%** of deaths caused by Islamist terrorist attacks in Pakistan



AVERAGE NUMBER OF DEATHS PER ATTACK

3.7	4.0	4.1
World	South Asia	Pakistan



YEMEN

NUMBER OF ATTACKS


1,657 [retained estimate]

1,710 [possible estimate]

NUMBER OF DEATHS

5,466 [retained estimate]

5,526 [possible estimate]



MAIN TARGETS



42.2% Military

700 attacks



24.0% Civilians

397 attacks



11.3% Government

187 attacks



10.6% Police

175 attacks

TYPE OF ATTACKS



700 Explosions (42.2%)



628 Armed assaults (37.9%)



145 Hostage takings/ Kidnappings (8.8%)



184 Others (11.1%)

MOST AFFECTED PROVINCES

Province	Number of attacks
Hadramaut	258
Abyan	380
Aden	174
Shabwah	154
Al Bayda	171


8.2% of Islamist terrorist attacks in the Middle East and North Africa took place in Yemen.

46.8% of deaths caused by Islamist terrorist attacks in Yemen are recorded since the beginning of the civil war in 2015.

DEADLIEST TERRORIST GROUP

Al-Qaeda

Responsible for **77.8%** of deaths caused by Islamist terrorist attacks in Yemen



AVERAGE NUMBER OF DEATHS PER ATTACK





ALGERIA*

NUMBER OF ATTACKS


1,387 [retained estimate]

1,530 [possible estimate]

NUMBER OF DEATHS

4,794 [retained estimate]

5,506 [possible estimate]



MAIN TARGETS



44.7% Civilians

620 attacks



26.0% Police

360 attacks



18.3% Military

254 attacks



6.6% Government

91 attacks

TYPE OF ATTACKS



679 Armed assaults (49.0%)



544 Explosions (39.2%)



55 Hostage takings/ Kidnappings (4.0%)



109 Others (7.8%)

MOST AFFECTED PROVINCES

Province	Number of attacks
Algiers	226
Boumerdès	213
Tizi Ouzou	115
Blida	84
Bouira	79


3 of the 5 most affected provinces by the Islamist terrorist attacks in Algeria are located in Kabylia, a mountainous territory of Berber tradition.

6.8% of Islamist terrorist attacks in the Middle East and North Africa occurred in Algeria.

DEADLIEST TERRORIST GROUP

Armed Islamic Group

Responsible for **30.4%** of deaths caused by Islamist terrorist attacks in Algeria



AVERAGE NUMBER OF DEATHS PER ATTACK



* The fact sheet for this country does not take into account the estimates of the black decade from 1991 to 2002, which according to sources vary between 44,000 and 200,000 deaths from Islamist terrorism.



EGYPT

NUMBER OF ATTACKS


1,367 [retained estimate]

1,461 [possible estimate]

NUMBER OF DEATHS

3,535 [retained estimate]

3,622 [possible estimate]



MAIN TARGETS



32.2% Police

440 attacks



29.6% Military

405 attacks



28.4% Civilians

388 attacks

TYPE OF ATTACKS



631 Armed assaults (46.2%)



554 Explosions (40.5%)



92 Hostage takings/ Kidnappings (6.7%)



90 Others (6.6%)

MOST AFFECTED PROVINCES

Province	Number of attacks
North Sinai	879
Minya	141
Cairo	86
Asyut	77
Giza	40

100% of Islamist terrorist attacks in North Sinai province occurred between 2011 and 2022.


95.0% of Islamist terrorist attacks in North Sinai Province have been claimed by the Islamic State.

37 attacks were claimed by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt between 1979 and 2021.

DEADLIEST TERRORIST GROUP

Islamic State

Responsible for **70.0%** of deaths caused by Islamist terrorist attacks in Egypt



AVERAGE NUMBER OF DEATHS PER ATTACK






PHILIPPINES

NUMBER OF ATTACKS

1,225 [retained estimate]
1,418 [possible estimate]

NUMBER OF DEATHS

1,991 [retained estimate]
2,497 [possible estimate]



MAIN TARGETS

- 43.0% Civilians**
527 attacks
- 23.9% Military**
293 attacks
- 10.4% Business**
128 attacks
- 7.6% Government**
93 attacks

TYPE OF ATTACKS

- 543 Explosions (44.3%)
- 377 Armed assaults (30.8%)
- 230 Hostage takings/ Kidnappings (18.8%)
- 75 Others (6.1%)

MOST AFFECTED PROVINCES


Province	Number of attacks
Basilan	236
Sulu	215
Maguinadaonao	189
North Cotabato	134
Lanao Del Sur	65

2000 was the year in which Islamist terrorism was the deadliest in the Philippines (96 attacks, 224 deaths).

75.3% of those killed in Islamist terrorist attacks in Southeast Asia were killed in the Philippines.

DEADLIEST TERRORIST GROUP

Abou Sayyaf
Responsible for **41.9%** of deaths caused by Islamist terrorist attacks in the Philippines



AVERAGE NUMBER OF DEATHS PER ATTACK





INDIA

NUMBER OF ATTACKS


925 [retained estimate]

1,403 [possible estimate]

NUMBER OF DEATHS

2,720 [retained estimate]

3,827 [possible estimate]



MAIN TARGETS



33.8% Police
313 attacks



33.0% Civilians
306 attacks



20.1% Military
186 attacks



9.8% Government
91 attacks

TYPE OF ATTACKS



431 Armed assaults (46.6%)



350 Explosions (37.8%)



100 Hostage takings/ Kidnappings (10.8%)



44 Others (4.8%)

MOST AFFECTED PROVINCES

Province	Number of attacks
Jammu & Kashmir	768
Delhi	33
Maharashtra	26
Gujarat	20
Bihar	18

83.0% of Islamist terrorist attacks in India have occurred in Jammu and Kashmir province.

2008 was the year in which Islamist terrorism was the deadliest in India (51 attacks, 474 deaths).

DEADLIEST TERRORIST GROUP

Lashkar-e-Taiba

Responsible for **44.7%** of deaths caused by Islamist terrorist attacks in India



AVERAGE NUMBER OF DEATHS PER ATTACK






LIBYA

NUMBER OF ATTACKS

743 [retained estimate]
856 [possible estimate]

NUMBER OF DEATHS

1,528 [retained estimate]
1,591 [possible estimate]



MAIN TARGETS

- 52.2% Civilians**
388 attacks
- 24.5% Military**
182 attacks
- 7.7% Terrorist groups and militias**
53 attacks
- 6.9% Police**
51 attacks

TYPE OF ATTACKS

- 298 Explosions (40.1%)
- 194 Hostage takings/ Kidnappings (26.1%)
- 131 Armed assaults (17.6%)
- 120 Others (16.2%)

MOST AFFECTED PROVINCES

Province	Number of attacks
Sirte	284
Benghazi	140
Derna	96
Tripoli	45
Misrata	44

38.2% of Islamist terrorist attacks in Libya took place in Sirte Province.

15 Islamist terrorist attacks have targeted diplomatic institutions in Libya.

DEADLIEST TERRORIST GROUP

Islamic State

Responsible for **76.6%** of deaths caused by Islamist terrorist attacks in Libya



AVERAGE NUMBER OF DEATHS PER ATTACK




LES ATTENTATS ISLAMISTES DANS LE MONDE 1979-2024



Nouvelle édition
Données collectées jusqu'au 12 avril 2024

OCTOBRE 2024

الهجمات الإسلامية المتطرفة في العالم 1979-2024

2024











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Since 1979, the year of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the world has been shaken by jihadist terrorism. In forty-five years, Islamist attacks have multiplied, striking everywhere in the world, even at the heart of Western countries: in the United States, Spain, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, Israel... Through its blind violence, intensity, and repetition, Islamist terrorism fuels feelings of fear, mistrust, and suspicion towards Islam and Muslims, fostering their rejection worldwide, as well as the rising demands for authoritarianism and closure that we see gaining momentum in democracies.

It is surprising to note that, despite its significance and the fear and anxiety it generates, this Islamist violence has not been truly measured. Since 2018, Fondapol has been working to fill this gap through rigorous evaluation, identifying the forms that Islamist terrorism has taken over the decades since 1979, cataloging the acts it has inspired or initiated, estimating the number of its victims, and identifying the deadliest organizations and the most affected countries. The first edition of this pioneering work was published in November 2019 in a report titled *Islamist Attacks Worldwide. 1979-2019*. An update of our study was published in September 2021: *Islamist Attacks Worldwide. 1979-2021*. Both reports are available online on the fondapol.org website, in French and English. The first one is also available in Arabic.

Today, we offer readers a new update of our quantification work. This new update of our study considers attacks that have occurred until April 2024. This third edition comes in the context of a resurgence of Islamist terrorism, particularly in West Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, as well as the Middle East and even Israel with the horrific attacks carried out by Hamas on October 7, 2023.

We show that between 1979 and April 2024, at least 66,872 Islamist attacks have taken place worldwide. They have caused the deaths of at least 249,941 people. Afghanistan has been the country most affected by Islamist terrorism, followed by Somalia and Iraq. Within the European Union, France is the most concerned country, having suffered 85 Islamist attacks on its soil resulting in 334 deaths. We also show that most Islamist attacks have been committed in Muslim countries (86.3%). Moreover, most deaths caused by Islamist attacks (88.9%) have been recorded in Muslim countries.

The gathered information is unprecedented. We hope that its content and use will contribute to knowledge and to the quality of both public debate and decision-making.



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